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This thesis aims to create a Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) architecture in the Pacific. 
Since 1998, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has launched ballistic missiles 
either over or toward the United States and regional allies Japan and the Republic of 
Korea (ROK). In response, the United States has created the Ballistic Missile Defense 
System to defend the U.S. homeland from North Korean or Iranian missile attack. 
This thesis examines the factors influencing BMD efforts in the Pacific. It 
explores the military, political, and diplomatic concerns surrounding BMD cooperation in 
the United States, Japan and the ROK. After reviewing the contributing factors, this 
thesis outlines separate military and diplomatic objectives to be met in forming a BMD 
network in the Pacific.  
The proposed Pacific Phased Adaptive Approach (PPAA) is modeled after the 
European Phased Adaptive Approach. Initial phases deploy sensors and interceptors to 
Japan and the ROK. Later, phases utilize new technologies to enhance sensor coverage 
and intercept capability across the Pacific. The diplomatic initiatives build upon existing 
bilateral relations to achieve a trilateral U.S.-Japan-ROK defense agreement. The defense 
agreement is not necessary to fulfill the PPAA, but it allows for sharing of resources and 
efficient use of those resources. 
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Since 1998, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), also known as 
North Korea, has launched short-, medium- and long-range ballistic missiles either over 
or toward the United States and regional allies Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK), 
Philippines and Australia.1 Likewise, Iran has the largest ballistic missile inventory in the 
Middle East, conducts rigorous testing of their missile systems and remains an aggressor 
in regional and international politics. The U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) 
was brought into being by the National Missile Defense Act of 1999 as a direct response 
to the Iranian and North Korean threats.2 It is a global network of radars, interceptor 
missiles and personnel based throughout the United States, Europe, Middle East and 
Pacific, designed to defend the homeland and regional assets against an Iranian or North 
Korean ballistic missile attack. The current employment of BMD assets is based on 
regional defense plans. These plans and the placement of platforms are based on the 
concept of Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA).3 The PAA is the gradual implementation 
of BMD assets, into a region, over an extended period of time, which allows for continual 
testing and improvements to counter existing and evolving threats. Some regions have 
made more progress in the execution of this concept than in others. Currently, the 
European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) exists as an outline for defending Europe; 
the same cannot be said for the Pacific theater.  
The EPAA will provide U.S. missile defense for European allies against an 
Iranian missile threat. The first phase of the EPAA has already begun. Four U.S. guided 
missile destroyers (DDGs) are deploying to Rota, Spain. The second phase is the 
establishment of an Aegis Ashore site in Romania by 2015. The last phase is a second 
                                                 
1 Daryl Kimball, “Chronology of US-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy,” Arms Control 
Association, accessed June 5, 2014, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron. 
2 National Missile Defense Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106–38, (1999). 
3 “Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) Report February 2010,” U.S. Department of Defense, vi, 
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf.  
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Aegis Ashore site that will be online in Poland by 2018. Upon completion of the EPAA, 
Europe will have BMD coverage against short-, medium- and intermediate-range ballistic 
missiles. While the United States continues to support missile defense efforts in Japan 
and the ROK, a plan, such as the EPAA, does not exist for a more permanent defense 
structure against a North Korean missile launch. 
The first step toward a Pacific Phased Adaptive Approach (PPAA) requires 
adjusting the current defensive architecture while planning for a permanent regional and 
homeland defense. The PPAA will include lessons learned from previous missions and 
the use of assets from regional allies. The PPAA is based upon a legitimate threat from 
the DPRK. The satellite launch in 2012 was the only successful long-range launch by the 
DPRK. ROK, Japan and U.S. military platforms were employed to defend regional and 
national assets. This event served as a real-world event stressing the BMDS and BMD 
capabilities of regional allies. Through the identification of strengths and flaws in the 
system, review of lessons learned, and advancement of BMD technologies, a flexible and 
capable defense design can be created similar to the EPAA. 
This plan will then require actions by the executive branch of the U.S. 
government to be presented before the U.S. Congress in order to receive funding. Finally, 
the structuring of treaties and partnerships will be key due to geography and scarcity of 
resources. Europe has thus far seen cooperation among North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) member states. While a comparable multinational body does not 
exist in Asia, it is imperative that multilateral or multiple bilateral agreements be 
executed to achieve success in the Pacific region. 
The Pacific region is in need of a guiding course for ballistic missile defense 
posture and policy, therefore, the primary question is: What is the best path for the United 
States and its allies to take toward ensuring ballistic missile defense in the Pacific? Then, 
building from the primary question, the secondary question is: How can a version of the 
EPAA be developed in the Pacific? 
3 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Research shows that the platforms exist to counter a DPRK threat; however, there 
is room for improvement in coordination and integration. A Congressional Research 
Service (CRS) report from 2013 addresses the lack of a clear path for BMD in the Asia-
Pacific region.4 The report states that the clear direction of the EPAA does not exist for 
allies in the Middle East or Pacific. It is clear that there is intent to execute something 
similar to the EPAA throughout all theaters, but the report underscores the absence of a 
plan for asset and personnel deployment. The Canadian Defense and Foreign Affairs 
Institute draws a similar comparison between North Korea and Iran concerning the 
possibility of an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) launch.5 The report 
specifically outlines the need for a layered defense structure in the Pacific.6 
The deployment of assets and follow-on actions in the Pacific will be compared to 
the planned actions in the EPAA. The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review is the 
foundation for overall U.S. military strategy going forward.7 The performance of the 
BMDS has been scrutinized by congress seeking to identify shortfalls in testing, training 
and deployment of forces. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has reported 
mixed success in Ground Based Interceptor (GBI) testing.8 The GAO then published a 
report that outlines the limitations for GBI employment based upon testing requirements.9 
The GAO has also recommended the need to further test the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) 
4 Ian E. Rinehart, Steven A. Hildreth, and Susan V. Lawrence, Ballistic Missile Defense in the Asia-
Pacific Region: Cooperation and Opposition (CRS Report No. R43116) (Washington, DC: Congressional 
Research Service, 2013), 20–21, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R43116.pdf. 
5 Frank Harvey, Colin Robertson, and James Fergusson, “Canada and Ballistic Missile Defence,”
Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, March 2014, 
http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/CanadaBallisticMissileDefence.pdf. 
6 Ibid.
7 Chuck Hagel, Quadrennial Defense Review 2014 (Washington, DC: The Pentagon, 2014), 14–32.
8 Cristina T. Chaplain, Missile Defense: Mixed Progress in Achieving Acquisition Goals and
Improving Accountability (GAO-14-481T) (Washington, DC: GAO, 2014), 4, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-481T. 
9 Cristina Chaplain, Missile Defense: DOD’s report provides limited Insight on Testing Options for the
Ground-based Midcourse Defense System (GAO-14-350R) (Washington, DC: GAO, 2014), 16, 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/662856.pdf. 
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variants prior to deployment in order to avoid modification expenses.10 An individual 
analysis of SM-3 Block IIB capabilities and alternatives was conducted and found the 
Department of Defense (DOD) lacking a clear vision for future operations.11 Another 
GAO report outlines the EPAA and describes the issues experienced by the Missile 
Defense Agency (MDA) while deploying assets in support of the EPAA.12 This report 
contains a timeline for deployment of assets in Europe in support of the Obama 
administration’s policy for defending Europe. A similar report was published that is less 
than optimistic about the near future deployment of Aegis Ashore in the EPAA.13 Lastly, 
a GAO report found that integrated training is not occurring across the BMDS. Due to the 
size and number of assets, only 7 of 45 BMD exercises during a period from 2009 to 
2010 included elements from the tactical, operational and strategic levels.14 
The scrutiny endured by the EPAA from scholars and politicians can serve as a 
basis for improvement in the building of a PPAA. Although scarce, information regarding 
the capabilities of the North Korean missile brigades provides a starting point from which 
to form a capable defense system. The GAO and CRS have identified shortfalls and gaps 
in the current design of the U.S. BMDS. Through the execution of the EPAA and further 
testing of BMD technology, a feasible PPAA can be produced that will satisfactorily 
address the threat posed in the Pacific region. The design of the PPAA relies on the 
examination and comparison of the North Korean and Iranian threats. Once the threat is 
understood, analysis of the EPAA will allow for an appropriate conceptual migration to 
the Pacific theater. 
                                                 
10 Cristina Chaplain, Missile Defense: Mixed Progress in Achieving Acquisition Goals and Improving 
Accountability (GAO-14-351) (Washington, DC: GAO, 2014), 17–19, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-
14-351. 
11 Cristina Chaplain, Standard Missile-3 Block IIB Analysis of Alternatives (GAO-13-382R) 
(Washington, DC: GAO, 2013), 2, http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/652079.pdf. 
12 John H. Pendleton, Ballistic Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Address Implementation Issues and 
Estimate Long Term Costs for European Capabilities (GAO-14-314) (Washington, DC: GAO, 2014), 10–
24, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-314. 
13 Christina Chaplain, Regional Missile Defense: DOD’s Report Provided Limited Information; 
Assessment of Acquisition Risks is Optimistic (GAO-14-248R) (Washington, DC: GAO, 2014), 22, 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/661707.pdf. 
14 John H. Pendleton, Ballistic Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Training Integration and 
Increase Transparency of Training Resources (GAO-11-625) (Washington, DC: GAO, 2011), 30–32, 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/330/321144.pdf. 
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C. NORTH KOREA 
To best compare North Korea and Iran, a review of the ballistic missile programs 
and individual political situations is required. The successful satellite launch by the 
DPRK in late 2012 demonstrated advancements in intermediate-range ballistic missile 
(IRBM) and possible ICBM technology.15 In recent years, the DPRK has increased its 
rate of testing nuclear weapons by conducting underground detonations. If the DPRK 
combines ICBM technology with a nuclear warhead, then the DPRK could be capable of 
delivering a nuclear threat against the continental United States. Even if the DPRK only 
continues down the road of testing they stand the chance to mistakenly destroy a country 
and start an international crisis. 
North Korea’s recent history of aggression and deception begins with nuclear 
testing. In 1992, it became known to the world that the DPRK had taken nuclear material 
to be used for powering cities and converted it for weapons testing.16 In 2002, DPRK 
officials admitted to having the ability to enrich nuclear materials. North Korea’s 
withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 2003 
sparked international criticism. As a response, the United States, China, South Korea, 
Japan, and Russia invited North Korea to join a diplomatic discourse known as the Six 
Party Talks. The goal of the talks was to reach a peaceful resolution deterring North 
Korea’s path toward nuclear proliferation. The talks continued sporadically for five years, 
but ultimately failed to produce identifiable results. North Korea conducted two nuclear 
tests in 2006 and 2009. After a successful long-range missile launch, the DPRK 
conducted a third nuclear weapons test in February 2013.17 As it appears, the DPRK is 
determined to become a nuclear power. 
In tandem with the pursuit of nuclear weapons, North Korea has sought ballistic 
missile technology as a means of delivery. North Korea’s prime focus, based upon its 
                                                 
15 Jethro Mullen and Paul Armstrong, “North Korea Carries Out Controversial Rocket Launch,” CNN 
World, December 12, 2012, http://www.cnn.com/2012/12/11/world/asia/north-korea-rocket-launch/. 




inventory, has always been South Korea. The DPRK owns thousands of short-range 
missiles and artillery batteries capable of reaching any point in South Korea.18 The 
medium- and intermediate-range missiles scattered throughout the DPRK pose a threat to 
Japan, Guam, surrounding East Asia island nations and possibly Hawaii.19 The 
immediate concern to the United States is North Korea’s testing of long-range missiles 
and satellite launch vehicles. 
North Korea took its first step toward a long-range ballistic missile with the 
testing of a single stage Taepo-Dong missile, on 31 August 1998, from its east coast 
facility. The missile failed in flight, but flew over the Honshu plain of Japan in the 
direction of Tokyo. In July 2006 and April 2009, the DPRK conducted unsuccessful tests 
of its Taepo-Dong missile, this time using two-stage rockets. In 2012, the DPRK began 
conducting satellite launch tests from its west coast facility. After another failed attempt 
in April 2012, North Korea finally achieved relative success in December 2012 by 
launching a three-stage Taepo-Dong missile that successfully placed a satellite in orbit. 
The launch was conducted on a southern trajectory. U.S. officials confirmed that the 
satellite was in orbit but not functional.20 This launch can be interpreted as giving North 
Korea the ability to reach any target worldwide. In a worst-case scenario, the same launch 
trajectory could result in an atmospheric nuclear detonation above the east coast of the 
United States.21  
The missile provoking most concern amongst security analysts is the KN-08, 
suspected to be a road mobile ICBM.22 The problem with a road mobile ICBM is that it 
provides little, if any intelligence warnings prior to launch. Road mobile launchers can be 
                                                 
18 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea (Washington, DC: The Pentagon, 2014), 19, 
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/North_Korea_Military_Power_Report_2013-2014.pdf. 
19 Ibid. 
20 “North Korea,” Arms Control Association, accessed July 26, 2014, 
http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/northkoreaprofile. 
21 Peter Vincent Pry and R. James Woolsey, “How North Korea Could Cripple the US,” Wall Street 
Journal, May 21, 2013. 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324482504578455451910706908. 
22 “KN-08,” Missile Threat, accessed July 6, 2014, http://missilethreat.com/missiles/kn-08/. 
 7 
kept within underground facilities, prepared, and fueled for launch without being seen by 
satellites. When ready, the KN-08 could be deployed and launched within minutes. In this 
scenario, U.S. forces would need to remain on permanent alert status in the eventuality of 
a DPRK launch. 
North Korea is likely using its missile testing in conjunction with acts of peace to 
achieve unknown longer-term goals. As an example of this tendency, during the months 
of June and July 2014, North Korea conducted seven short-range ballistic missile 
launches. The launches originated in close proximity to the tense North-South Korean 
border and landed in the western portion of the Sea of Japan. The DPRK stated that the 
launches were practice in preparation for the bombardment of military bases in South 
Korea. In a tradition of aggression tied to historic dates, the display also coincided with 
the anniversary of the cease-fire that concluded the Korean War in 1953. According to 
journalists, it is possible that this round of firing was being used as leverage to admit 
North Korean athletes into the upcoming Asian Games to be held in Incheon, South 
Korea.23  
The international community has responded to North Korean provocations 
through a combination of diplomatic and economic sanctions. In turn, the DPRK has 
followed the course of continued defiance. Many of the issues encountered when dealing 
with the DPRK are the result of an inability, on the part of the international community, 
to predict the North Korean actions and reactions. The seemingly irrational behavior of 
the leadership in the DPRK has resulted in the sinking of ROK Navy ship Cheonan 
(PCC-772), the artillery shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, multiple short-range surface to 
air missile launches, and the execution of party leader Jang Song Thaek.24 
The recent past of North Korea is riddled with senseless acts. On 26 March 2010, 
a North Korean torpedo sank the guided missile patrol boat ROKN Cheonan. Officials 
from North Korea denied any and all wrongdoing. North Korea stated that the findings of 
                                                 
23 “Defying UN Censure, North Korea Blasts Missile Into Sea of Japan,” Japan Times, July 27, 2014, 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/07/27/asia-pacific/defying-u-n-censure-north-korea-blasts-missile-
into-sea-of-japan/#.U9VtNf2QD0s. 
24 Daryl Kimball, “Chronology of US-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy,” Arms Control 
Association, accessed June 5, 2014, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron. 
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a North Korean torpedo were completely false and fabricated by the South Korean 
government to create a crisis. It is clear that the death of 46 ROKN sailors came at the 
hands of a North Korean submarine in the vicinity of the maritime border.25 Later that 
same year on 23 November 2010, North Korea fired artillery shells into the island of 
Yeonpyeong. The shelling killed two ROK marines and injured 15 more. The island lies 
only 8 miles from the disputed border and the artillery came as South Korea was 
conducting one of its largest annual military exercises. In response, South Korea returned 
artillery fire in the direction of the North Korea coastline and placed fighter jets on alert 
status.26 This escalation heightened tensions to a level not seen in recent years. 
The previously discussed belligerent actions by North Korea have provoked 
worldwide response. As a general rule, the United States has issued economic sanctions 
coupled with soft military actions in response to provocative actions by the DPRK. As a 
starting point, a Congressional Research Service report details the United States’ 
relationship with North Korea in response to nuclear testing, including aid and 
sanctions.27 The report states that the DPRK has received over $1 billion dollars in aid 
from the United States since the 1990s. The economic aid has been primarily in response 
to threats issued by Pyongyang to continue their pursuit of nuclear technology or missile 
testing.  
Similarly, Rolan Bleiker, a professor of international relations, wrote an article 
focusing on the shifting U.S. foreign policy beginning in the 1990s and continuing 
through the second North Korean nuclear crisis in the early 2000s. The conclusion of his 
article describes a no-win situation for the United States due to a complete misconception 
of the underlying driving force for North Korean foreign policy. He believes it is 
improbable to produce a productive response to North Korean provocations without 
understanding the highly secretive internal driving forces of the regime. 
                                                 
25 “North Korean Torpedo Sank South’s Ship,” BBC News, May 20, 2010, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10129703. 
26 Mark McDonald, “Crisis Status in South Korea After North Shells Island,” New York Times, 
November 23, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/24/world/asia/24korea.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
27 Emma Chanlett-Avery and Ian E. Rinehart, North Korea: U.S. Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and 
Internal Situation (CRS Report No. R41259) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2014), 
14–22, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R41259.pdf. 
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In light of the DPRK’s actions, Bruce Klingner, a senior research fellow at the 
Heritage Foundation, wrote an opinion piece describing a course correction for our 
current policy.28 Klinger’s paper focuses on more contemporary issues and clearly 
desires to impose sanctions upon North Korea that are similar to those imposed on Iran. 
Klinger sees China as a likely political roadblock, but that China could eventually be 
persuaded to support tighter United Nation resolutions with added pressure from the 
international community. 
The previously mentioned examples describe a pattern of threat, then sanction and 
eventually economic aid or negotiation that has resulted in a seeming confidence amongst 
the ruling party in the DPRK when dealing with the United States. Under the current 
course it seems that the DPRK will achieve nuclear weapons capability despite the 
disapproval of the international community. The DPRK has proven to be an irrational 
actor with sufficient missile technology en route to ICBM capability. In this light, the 
DPRK is a threat to allies and U.S. national security concerns, which requires a prepared 
response.  
D. IRAN 
Unlike North Korea, Iran has not launched a ballistic missile in a provocative 
direction.  Similar to the DPRK, Iran has demonstrated a proficiency in short- and 
medium-range ballistic missiles. Likewise, Iran successfully launched a satellite in 2008, 
possibly experimenting with ICBM technology.29 Nuclear facilities and technology 
within Iran, despite multilateral sanctions, continue to create tensions throughout the 
region. In response to Iran’s display of missile technology and less-than-honest dealings 
in nuclear technology, the United States continues to send Navy ships to patrol the 
Persian Gulf in defense of Israel and European allies. By observation of actions, it is clear 
that the United States takes the Iranian threat seriously. 
                                                 
28 Bruce Klinger, “Time to Get North Korean Sanctions Right,” Backgrounder, no. 2850 (2013): 1–11, 
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17, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/18/world/middleeast/18iran.html?_r=0. 
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As recently as the summer of 2014, Iran took part in negotiations with the 
international community concerning its nuclear facilities. The discussions held in Vienna, 
Austria, were between Iran, the permanent members of the UN Security Council, and 
Germany. The talks took place to ensure Iran grants full access of its facilities to the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).30 The hope is that international inspectors 
will ensure Iran is in compliance with the NPT. Iran has expressed a desire to pursue 
nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, but has also threatened regional neighbor Israel 
with all-out war. Managing tensions in the region are key to U.S. national interests. While 
Israel remains the strongest ally to the United States in the Middle East, the hawkish 
nature of Israel in regards to Iran could escalate the already tenuous situation. The current 
Iranian inventory of missiles is capable of targeting Israel and Eastern Europe, but with 
further testing and a desire to maintain regional power, Iran is likely to develop ICBM 
technology capable of striking the United States and Western Europe. 
Iran’s nuclear program raises alarms because of potential to be combined with its 
missile program. According to Michael Elleman, a senior fellow for missile defense at 
the International Institute for Strategic Studies, “Iran has the largest and most diverse 
ballistic missile arsenal in the Middle East.”31 Iran continues to be amongst the top 
nations in missile test launches. Iran began testing medium-range ballistic missiles 
(MRBMs) in 1998, likely based off the North Korean No Dong missile. In that last 16 
years, Iran has conducted 26 MRBM test launches; 12 more than North Korea.32 Most 
disturbing is the possibility of an Iranian ICBM. The directors of National Intelligence 
and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), James Clapper and Lt. General Michael 
Flynn, have both confirmed that Iran is capable of conducting an ICBM or space launch 
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vehicle test by 2015.33 This capability places the U.S. and Europe within range of Iranian 
missiles. Although Iran has allowed the international community to inspect nuclear 
facilities, Tehran has declared its missile program as necessary to remain a global power.  
Coupled with Iran’s missile and nuclear weapons capability is a history of causing 
instability, similar to the DPRK. During the current Gaza-Israel conflict of 2014, Iran’s 
Ayatollah Khamenei has urged all Muslims to join together in a stance against Israel.34 
Iran’s Supreme Leader has gone so far as to say “the only solution is to destroy this 
regime.”35 While Iran has recently replaced Mahmoud Ahmadinejad with Hassan 
Rouhani as the President of Iran, the second highest post in the Iranian government,. 
Rouhani continued the same stance of not acknowledging the holocaust. During a 2013 
trip to the U.S., Rouhani agreed that the acts of the Nazis were reprehensible, but then 
later retracted his statement to be more in agreement with the hardliners in Iran.36 The 
domestic politics of Iran involve balancing a group of religious ultra-conservatives with 
the economic needs of moderate Iranians. Iran has struggled economically under United 
Nations (UN) sanctions, but continues to appear unflinching in its hatred of Israel, the 
United States and allied European nations. 
The most quantifiable way of gauging international response toward Iranian 
aggression are the numerous UN Security Council Resolutions (SCR) regarding Iran. To 
date, the UN has adopted six resolutions aimed at curtailing Iran’s nuclear and ballistic 
missile programs.37 The resolutions have been part of the P5+1 (permanent Security 
Council plus Germany) measures. UN SCR 1696, 1737, 1747, 1803, 1835 and 1929 
imposed economic and military sanctions while requesting IAEA inspections of nuclear 
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facilities.38 Multiple resolutions were required due to Iran’s non-compliance with 
previous measures. 
The international community has attempted to curb Iranian nuclear and missile 
advancement through diplomatic means. Iran has proven to be deceitful in its pursuit of 
nuclear technology and outright defiant in its ballistic missile program. While the UN, led 
by the United States and regional partners, has attempted to stifle the Iranian economy in 
hopes of slowing defense spending, Iran remains a constant threat to the U.S. and allied 
national security interests. As all parties remain hopeful for a diplomatic and political 
solution, NATO and the United States are also planning for the worst-case scenario. 
E. THE EPAA RESPONSE TO IRAN 
If all diplomatic and peaceful means of negotiation result in failure, then a nuclear 
weapon delivered by ballistic missile originating from Iran poses a direct threat to the 
Middle East and Europe. To counter the threat of an Iranian missile, the United States has 
established a series of radars, sensors and command and control stations to defend 
regional partners now and in the future. The European Phased Adaptive Approach 
(EPAA) is in direct response to a possible Iranian launch against U.S. allies in the Middle 
East and Europe. 
To begin, the United States has built the Ballistic Missile Defense System 
(BMDS) to counter a ballistic missile threat. The BMDS is composed of sensors, 
interceptors and communications assets. Upgraded Early Warning Radars (UEWR) are 
positioned in Alaska, California, Massachusetts, the UK and Greenland. The UEWR are 
capable of tracking ICBMs and providing intercept data to land based interceptors. 
Another sensor is the Sea Based X-band radar (SBX). SBX is a large X-band radar 
mounted on a mobile oil platform operated by the U.S. Navy under the command of the 
Missile Defense Agency (MDA). SBX is currently stationed in the Pacific and is capable 
of tracking ICBM threats while providing cueing data to land-based interceptors. Next, 
the AN/TPY-2 is a transportable X-band radar operated by the U.S. Army and currently 
deployed in Japan, the Middle East and Turkey. Lastly, the Space Tracking and 
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Surveillance System (STSS) is a system of satellites capable of detecting intense heat 
signatures such as missile launches.39 
The BMDS also consists of assets capable of independent tracking and intercept. 
U.S. Navy cruisers and destroyers are capable of tracking all classes of ballistic missiles 
and intercepting all missiles except the ICBM.  The U.S. Navy uses the Standard Missile-
3 (SM-3) to conduct ballistic missile intercepts. Aegis Ashore is a U.S. Navy asset that 
mirrors the capabilities and equipment found on a ship, but places it on land to conduct 
the BMD mission. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) is a readily 
deployable, land-based U.S. Army asset capable of tracking and intercepting short to 
intermediate-range missiles in the terminal phase of flight. THAAD is mobile, but 
requires heavy-lift Air Force platforms for deployment. Patriot Advanced Capability-3 
(PAC-3) is a U.S. Army point defense system capable of tracking and intercepting short-
range missiles. PAC-3 also requires Air Force assistance for rapid deployment. This asset 
has also been purchased by several foreign militaries through the approval of congress. 
The only asset that requires the assistance of separate asset for tracking data is the 
Ground Based Interceptor (GBI).  
GBIs are based in Alaska and California, operated by the U.S. Air Force, and are 
designed to defend the U.S. against an ICBM attack coming from either the west or east 
coast. The Obama administration approved an extra $1 billion to add fourteen GBIs into 
the Fort Greely, Alaska site.40 This addition will bring the total of GBIs to 44. These 
interceptors rely upon Aegis ships, AN/TPY-2 radars, SBX and UEWR for targeting and 
intercept capability. Finally, the BMDS utilizes a series of satellites and computer 
networks known as Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications 
(C2BMC) to plan, practice and pass data throughout the global architecture.41  
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The EPAA is broken into four distinct phases. The first phase utilizes existing 
AN/TPY-2 radars in Israel, Turkey and Qatar and then adds forward stationing of BMD 
capable ships in Rota, Spain. The ships in Rota, Spain can be used for multiple missions 
throughout the 6th Fleet Area of Responsibility (AOR), but are distinctly necessary to 
provide BMD coverage for eastern and central Europe. The second phase, to be 
completed by 2015, is the completion of an Aegis Ashore site in Romania. This base will 
provide increased sensor and interceptor coverage of Europe. The last planned phase of 
the EPAA is the installation of a second Aegis Ashore site in Poland. The site is planned 
to be online by 2018 and will add a layer of defense for the more western and northern 
European nations. The fourth phase of the EPAA was the deployment of the SM-3 Block 
IIB. The proposed upgrade to the Standard Missile was to be more capable against long 
range and possibly ICBM threats. The program has since been canceled in lieu of 
enhancements to the existing GBI program.42 The radars and interceptors have been 
linked by C2BMC and existing BMD networks to include data sharing amongst NATO 
allies.43 
The proposed deployment of BMD assets is possible because the missile defense 
situation in Europe involves an existing framework of political alliances centered on 
NATO. The 2009 announcement by U.S. President Obama to execute the EPAA was 
proclaimed to be a contribution to the overall NATO mission of BMD.44 Under the 
current framework of the EPAA, the United States gains a more prominent position in 
European defense. The United States will benefit politically from the resulting increase in 
working relations between U.S. forces and the host nations.  
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These partnerships, while aimed at Iran, have drawn criticism from Russia.45 
Russia has always viewed an increase in U.S. involvement in Europe as an affront to 
Russian supremacy. In addition to the existing two GBI sites in Alaska and California, 
President Bush announced a “third site plan” in 2007. This plan would have placed a 
series of GBIs into Poland.46 Russia responded by threatening to place short and medium 
range ballistic missiles into sites on their southern and western borders. When President 
Obama took office in 2008, the situation of missile defense in Europe remained 
unresolved. NATO supported an increase of U.S. BMD assets in Europe, but the Obama 
administration sought to reshape U.S. foreign policy in regards to Russia. The 2009 
announcement of the EPAA by the Obama administration was seen as less threatening to 
Russia while continuing to support NATO BMD.  
While the EPAA and capabilities have been briefed to Russian leaders, they 
continue to contend that the EPAA poses a real threat to Russian strategic security. As 
briefed, the U.S. missile interceptors based in Poland and Romania are designed to have 
capability against a limited Iranian launch of medium or intermediate range ballistic 
missiles. The consensus opinion among scientists and strategists is that U.S. BMD does 
not have the capability to defeat an all-out ICBM attack by Russia.47 Due to the vast 
amount of Russian ICBMs and the physics required to defeat the speeds reached by 
ICBMs, the policy of mutually assured destruction is the only real deterrent against a 
Russian attack.48 Given the high level of missile technology in Russia it is unlikely that 
Russian politicians, strategists and military leaders view EPAA assets as a deterrent to 
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their own missile systems. The actual threat of the EPAA is the weakening of Russian 
influence in regards to regional and international geopolitics. 
Regardless of political turmoil, the actual EPAA has not been without its faults. 
Congress has provided legislative oversight throughout the development of multiple 
BMD assets. On behalf of Congress, the GAO has investigated the status of GBI 
testing.49 The GBI test in July 2013, FTG-07, was an unsuccessful trial of the CE-II kill 
vehicle. That same version of the GBI just recently achieved a successful intercept on 22 
June 2014.50 After two failed attempts, the CE-II modification will allow the Missile 
Defense Agency (MDA) to take receipt of upgraded GBIs, including the 14 requested by 
the Obama administration. The additional GBIs will be added to the existing facility in 
Fort Greely, AK. The GAO also released a report emphasizing the underperformance of 
GBI and the impact on future deployment.51 Amongst the limitations is the ability to 
replicate an inbound ICBM. All current tests of the GBI system have utilized a north to 
south trajectory, while an actual North Korean ICBM would be on a west to east 
trajectory.  
The GAO has noted the possibility of incurring additional cost during SM-3 
acquisition unless adequate preliminary testing is conducted.52 The SM-3 tests begin with 
preliminary flight runs and conclude with scenario-based SM-3 intercepts of ballistic 
missile test platforms. Due to an inflight failure of one SM-3 Block IB, the entire system 
came under scrutiny. Then the GAO analyzed the anticipated alternatives to the SM-3 
Block IIB capabilities and found that the DOD does not have a proposed solution to 
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bridge the intercept ability of the SM-3 Block II-B.53 The SM-3 Block IIB was set to be a 
navy response to the GBI, but has since been removed from the last phase of the EPAA.54 
At this point, the only ability to counter an inbound ICBM is with a GBI from the west 
coast of the United States.  
The MDA has experienced setbacks while deploying Aegis ships and Aegis 
Ashore in support of the EPAA.55 MDA and its subordinate commands experienced 
increased costs and gaps in support during initial deployment. Specifically with Aegis 
Ashore, the USN has never before had to station operational commanders on land in 
foreign nations conducting active defense missions. These Aegis Ashore stations in 
Romania, and then Poland, require manning and training that does not currently exist. 
This phase of deployment has not yet been correlated to supporting commands needed to 
establish a pipeline of qualified operators. 
The EPAA has been viewed as a successful policy in regards to European 
alliance, but it lacked realistic planning for execution. A CRS report spoke about gaps in 
testing and procurement of Aegis Ashore, which could delay deployment of functioning 
systems.56 In response to congressional inquiry, GAO has accused MDA of purchasing 
systems without conducting satisfactory testing to meet intended capabilities.57 Finally, 
system wide training has been found to be lacking. Due to the size of the BMDS it has 
proven to be difficult organizing and executing an integrated training and exercise 
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schedule across tactical, operational and strategic commands.58 If the EPAA is to be 
implemented properly, training will need to increase to meet current requirements. 
The EPAA has been a bold move not only politically but militarily. The 
deployment of forces overseas utilizing new technologies has encountered growing pains. 
The setbacks have been the cost of attempting to tie action to policy. The testing of 
technology can be seen as slowing the process of deployment, but can also be seen as 
vital to deploying a capable force.  
As an example of testing and active deployment, the United States partnered with 
Israel to create a layered ballistic missile defense system including Aegis platforms, 
AN/TPY-2 radars, PAC-3 batteries and the Israeli Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and Arrow 
defense systems.59 The United States has been able to learn from the deployment of 
forces in support of Israel’s defense and implement them in the EPAA. As outlined in the 
EPAA, the permanent architecture includes AN/TPY-2 radars, Aegis Ashore, and the 
forward basing of Aegis platforms.60 As the EPAA progresses, lessons can be gathered to 
benefit future versions of the Phased Adaptive Approach in other regions. 
F. THE PPPA RESPONSE TO NORTH KOREA 
Each time the DPRK threatens to launch a missile there is a new patchwork of 
assets brought to use. While there is a persistent layered defense network in the Central 
Command (CENTCOM) and European Command (EUCOM) areas of responsibility, 
Pacific Command (PACOM) and Northern Command (NORTHCOM) continue to 
change their concept of operations. The number and location of Aegis ships, PAC-3 
batteries, use of Sea Based X-Band Radar (SBX), partnership with JSDF, and partnership 
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with ROK Army (ROKA) and ROK Navy (ROKN) have each been variables during 
every operation.61 
Based on the need for BMD in the Pacific, there is cause to identify a valid path 
ahead for a Pacific Phased Adaptive Approach (PPAA). The platforms in use today must 
be paired with current forms of missile defense technology while keeping in mind future 
testing and upgrades. The sensors, interceptors and communications must be coordinated 
and de-conflicted by an established command and control structure in a PPAA.  
The employment of previously mentioned BMD systems in a PPAA is likely 
similar to the EPAA. The first phase includes the forward basing of U.S. Navy Aegis 
cruisers and destroyers. There are currently five BMD capable ships in 7th Fleet and two 
more destroyers are en route.62 This number does not include the ships that transit 
through the 7th Fleet area of responsibility (AOR) headed to 5th Fleet. These ships 
require the necessary SM-3 interceptors to combat a North Korean launch. The issue at 
the heart of SM-3 interceptors is a question of production and allocation split between the 
6th, 5th and 7th fleets.63 
The best-case scenario of a first phase PPAA includes ROK, JSDF and Australian 
naval forces. Currently ROK operates three destroyers capable of tracking, but not 
intercepting, ballistic missiles. In December 2012, the ROK requested three more Sejong 
the Great Class destroyers from the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff.64 These ships will be 
equally capable of tracking missiles but will be equipped with the soon to be deployed 
SM-6. The ROK version of SM-6 will give ROKN forces increased ability to conduct 
surface and air warfare, but will still lack ballistic missile intercept capability. 
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The JMSDF currently operate six destroyers of the Kongou and Atago classes. 
Each destroyer is capable of tracking and intercepting ballistic missiles with the SM-3 
Blk-1A, comparable to the current U.S. capability. JMSDF has also requested two more 
destroyers to meet the goal of eight BMD capable ships. With eight ships the JMSDF 
hopes to have enough ships ready to deploy and defend the homeland while conducting 
maintenance and repairs in a permanent rotation.65 
On the fringe of possible BMD capability is Australia. While Australia operates 
Aegis equipped destroyers, they lack BMD capability. Australia currently does not view 
BMD as a warfare area fundamental to their territorial integrity. The hope is that through 
expanding cooperation in the Asia Pacific region, the United States could leverage 
Australian capability to offset the burden of patrolling BMD operating areas in defense of 
U.S. or allied high value assets.66 
The second and third phases of the EPAA involve Aegis Ashore and forward 
positioned radars.67 The PPAA would follow the same path as its predecessor. Radars are 
already in place throughout ROK and Japan. In October 2013, the United States and 
Japan announced a plan to deploy a second AN/TPY-2 radar near Kyoto, Japan. The 
radar will improve search and detect capability necessary to defend the Japanese and U.S. 
homeland against a North Korean ballistic missile attack.68 Network and data sharing 
concerns have been difficult to overcome due to the historical angst between ROK and 
Japan. Previous attempts to form a trilateral data sharing agreement have failed in the 
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finals hours prior to signing.69 Aegis Ashore could be a viable option for Guam, Hawaii 
or even the Honshu plain in Japan. Aegis Ashore has conducted initial testing in Barking 
Sands, Hawaii. The test facility in Hawaii is scheduled to begin intercept testing in 
conjunction with the EPAA deployment.70 From initial reports, there is no reason to 
believe Aegis Ashore will be any less successful than Aegis intercepts conducted on 
cruisers and destroyers. 
Once the military objectives have been stated in the PPAA, the legislative and 
diplomatic functions of the U.S. government must be synchronized. Future operations 
must be a balance of multinational forces to prevent the overuse of platforms and undue 
burden on any individual nation. In the Quadrennial Defense Review, the United States 
made missile defense a top priority.71 Through the stationing of forces in Japan72, 
Guam73 and South Korea,74 the United States is tied to the cooperative defense of 
regional allies. Due to the shared threat of missile attack amongst Pacific allies, the 
United States is in a unique position to broker mutual defense agreements, specifically 
regarding BMD. Missile defense requires the sharing of classified data across satellites 
and the use of specialized receivers to decrypt and use the data. The United States has all 
the technology and equipment necessary to conduct these missions, but has not solidified 
a trilateral or multilateral data sharing agreement between Japan, Korea or Australia. 
Personnel within the DOD can utilize the recent shift in U.S. national interest toward the 
Pacific to press politicians for increased cooperation at the international level. 
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A strong partnership with Japan is crucial for U.S. interests in the region. There 
are roughly 90,000 U.S. DOD personnel in Japan.75 If a missile were fired into Japan, 
U.S. citizens and their politicians would expect a plan to be in place to protect our 
interests abroad. Japan recently took a large step toward mutual defense by announcing a 
reinterpretation of their constitution.  
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe made news by stating that under the new 
interpretation, Japanese forces could come to the defense of allies without being directly 
attacked.76 Prior to this statement Japanese forces could not intervene into a battle 
between two other nations such as China and the United States. This move comes amidst 
rising tensions in the first and second island chains where China has increased naval and 
air presence, thus provoking more and more response from Japanese and U.S. forces. 
South Korea, although not mentioned in Prime Minister Abe’s announcement will be 
bear some burden as a result of the change in policy. As Japan increases ties with the 
United States, China may feel threatened, which then places South Korea in awkward 
position of opposing Chinese territorial expansion, but still attempting to resist bilateral 
ties to the Japanese military while maintaining partnership with the United States. 
As Japan tightens ties with the United States, the ROK announced it will not 
pursue a U.S. led BMD system for the defense of Korea.77 South Korea has instead 
decided to implement its own domestic systems known as the Korean Air and Missile 
Defense (KAMD) system and Kill Chain. This move will likely stop any conversation 
about adding an intercept capability to the Korean Aegis equipped ships. The only 
exception seems to be THAAD. The new defense minister Han Min-koo has said that 
THAAD could have a place in the defense architecture for South Korea.78 THAAD can 
be a diplomatic solution to adding U.S. BMD into South Korea without provoking a 
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response from China. THAAD is only capable of defending a limited area against short 
or medium range missiles; ideal for the North Korean threat against South Korea. The 
newly selected defense minister in ROK can have a significant impact in regional BMD 
going forward by either electing to pursue domestic technology or by expanding 
international partnerships in defense. Regardless of origin, ROK BMD can contribute to 
the PPAA. 
G. IMPLICATIONS 
The current U.S. foreign policy in regards to Iran and the DPRK has been a series 
of negotiations and sanctions. The United States and allies view Iran as capable of a 
missile attack and have thus announced the EPAA combat the threat. While the DPRK 
has been labeled as a rogue nation and capable of a provocative first strike, the United 
States still lacks a concrete military strategy to combat a worst-case scenario.  
There must be a long-term path to success, similar to the EPAA, for BMD in the 
Pacific theater. It will require the partnership of multiple nations to share the burden 
financially and militarily. After reviewing the real world events, capabilities, and 
limitations, a recommendation for use of available sensors, tested interceptors, and 
unified communications architecture can be proposed. To reach the relative level of 
success of the EPAA, the PPAA must first be created. The PPAA concept of operations 
and supporting assets will likely be similar to the EPAA but augmented for geography, 
threat, regional constraints and available assets. The PPAA will be formed from the triad 
of sensors, interceptors and communications, all being coordinated by a unified command 
structure.  
Once designed, the PPAA can then be proposed by the DOD, through the White 
House, as a piece of legislation to gather required funding from the U.S. Congress. The 
deployment of assets such as Aegis Ashore or the acquisition of SM-3s requires the 
power of the purse, delineated to the U.S. Congress. If approved by the U.S. Congress, 
the PPAA will have enhanced legitimacy. Diplomats and military liaisons to achieve 
informal, and later formal, agreements at the bilateral and multilateral level can leverage 
this legitimacy. 
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The PPAA will be a significant statement of U.S. foreign policy and bring 
military actions into alignment with U.S. strategic interests in the Pacific theater. The 
political difficulties of pursuing a PPAA seem daunting. To form alliances between bitter 
rivals (Japan and ROK) without provoking a response from the regional power (China) 
will require a unified strategic objective to be executed in the military, legislative and 
diplomatic arenas simultaneously. The result of the PPAA will be a permanent defense 
structure, which increases security cooperation throughout the Pacific theater.  
H. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The satellite launch in 2012 was the only successful long-range launch by DPRK. 
The ROK, Japan and U.S. military platforms were employed to defend regional and 
national assets. This event served as a real world event stressing the BMDS and BMD 
capabilities of regional allies. Through the identification of strengths and flaws in the 
system, review of lessons learned, and advancement of BMD technologies, a flexible and 
capable defense design can be created similar to the EPAA.  
After developing a background of current events, the cost and availability of 
military assets will be discussed. BMD revolves around the triad of sensors, interceptors 
and communications. Coordinating each capability requires a sound command structure. 
Each asset requires justification for funding. Once funded, assets are employed based 
upon operational needs and perceived threats.  BMD platforms are constantly being 
tested and modified to ensure reliability. As budget concerns grow, procurement and 
testing will be integral to equipping the military with capable platforms. Testimony 
before congress, proposed budgets and testing reports will be consulted for this portion of 
the paper. Scholarly journals and newspaper articles will be used to create context for the 
data intense portions. 
Next the opportunities and constraints of the diplomatic arena will be reviewed. 
The opportunities include policy shifts as the U.S. military aligns toward the Pacific and 
increases ties with regional allies. Constraints include the opposition of regional powers 
and the costs of improving relationships with regional allies. Testimony before congress, 
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Department of State press releases, and scholarly articles will be used for support. 
Newspaper articles will be used to create background. 
After reviewing the real world events, capabilities, and limitations a 
recommendation for use of available sensors, tested interceptors, and unified 
communications architecture will be proposed. This concept of operations and supporting 
assets will likely be similar to the EPAA but augmented for geography, threat, regional 
constraints and available assets. 
I. OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE 
The introduction is a background and comparison of North Korea and Iran. To 
counter the Iranian threat, the US and NATO have announced the EPAA. The assets in 
the Pacific region lack persistent bilateral or trilateral agreements to ease cooperation and 
coordination.  
The next chapter details the military factors concerning a possible PPAA. First 
there will be an examination of the current EPAA execution. The military budget and 
manning issues will be reviewed. This section will also describe the current state of 
testing and technology as well as planned tests going forward. 
The third chapter will focus on the supporting role of the U.S. government in 
advancing the goals of the PPAA. To be on par with the EPAA, the PPAA will require 
funding, international agreements and the support of the executive branch. The focus here 
will shift to policy and grand strategy vice military concepts of operations. 
After reviewing the obstacles to success, the heart of the thesis will be the 
proposal of a PPAA. The PPAA will be a unified structure of sensors, shooters, and 
communications across the Pacific region utilizing allied assets and personnel in 
conjunction with the U.S. BMDS. The PPAA may likely mirror the EPAA with the 
addition or deletion of assets to account for threat, geography and ally capabilities. 
The conclusion will summarize the historical context and steps already taken to 
create a BMD structure in the Pacific. Finally, the feasibility of plan execution and likely 
actions to be taken by the U.S. will be proposed as a matter for future research. 
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II. MILITARY CAPABILITY, COST, AND AVAILABILITY 
The first chapter outlined how the DPRK ballistic missile program is a threat to 
the Pacific region and the United States. The next step is to form a baseline of current 
capabilities. The format and costs of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) 
will be critiqued to determine the feasibility of a unilateral or multilateral effort in the 
Pacific. Next, reviewing Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) program costs in respect to the 
President’s Budget Request will provide a reference point for future acquisition. As 
missile defense involves procurement and testing simultaneously, the state of testing will 
be reviewed in an attempt to forecast procurement issues. Last, there will be a review of 
recently cancelled programs and those programs still in the research and development 
phase. The feasibility of a PPAA is directly related to the success or failure of the EPAA, 
cost of platforms, and platform availability. A positive step toward the PPAA is planning 
realistically for execution by identifying the contributing factors in regards to the U.S. 
military. 
A. EPAA STRUCTURE AND ASSOCIATED COSTS 
Phase I of the EPAA allowed the U.S. Navy to gain a more permanent foothold in 
the Mediterranean Sea. On October 5, 2011, then Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta 
announced that Spain would host the stationing of four Aegis destroyers capable of 
contributing to the EPAA.79 This move to add forces to the European theater came amidst 
a controversial decision to remove Army forces for budgetary reasons. In 2012, the 
Obama administration confirmed it would be rotating two of the four Army brigades 
stationed in Europe back to the United States. The redeployment of these brigades was 
agreed upon in order to save an estimated $487B through 2022.80 In order to resolve the 
ambiguity, the GAO reviewed the U.S. Navy’s alternatives to the forward stationing of 
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ships and found the U.S. Navy’s estimate of alternatives to be “inconsistent and 
incomplete.”81 The U.S. Navy has recently moved to favor the stationing of ships in 
forward bases to be closer to areas of interest. The U.S. Navy has added forward 
deployed assets to Bahrain, Guam, Japan, Singapore and now Rota, Spain. A CRS report 
has estimated that it will cost $92M to move the four ships and their dependents to Rota 
and then an additional $100M annually to support operations.82 In a response to the GAO 
report, the U.S. Navy considers the immediate cost of forward basing to be less expensive 
than rotating crews and ships from bases within the United States. In a final counter, the 
GAO reviewed these estimated and determined they lacked long term forecasting for 
depot level maintenance that can radically increase associated costs.83 
The Command, Control, Battle Management and Communications (C2BMC) 
system has been installed at NATO’s Alliance headquarters in Ramstein, Germany, as 
part of the initial phase of the EPAA. The C2BMC has been integrated into NATO’s 
Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD). ALTBMD was originally 
designed to protect NATO troops but has been expanded to provide missile defense for 
all NATO population centers.84 According to a NATO media press release in 2012, the 
alliance will pay for the cost of the command and control system evenly across the 28 
member states. The shared cost for all BMD efforts across Europe was expected to be 
roughly 90M Euros annually between 2012 and 2020.85 An individual cost assessment of 
implementing the C2BMC node capable of integrating into NATO’s ALTBMD system 
could not be found. As a means of forming an estimate, according to testimony before a 
U.S. Senate committee hearing, the cost of operating the C2BMC across all sites for 
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FY14 was $418M.86 This is the same number printed in a budget item justification 
released by the MDA, stating that the total program requested budget for the C2BMC 
during FY14 was $418M.87 
The BMD elements under most scrutiny are the Aegis Ashore sites in Romania 
and Poland. The site in Romania was commissioned on October 10, 2014.88 The U.S. 
Navy and MDA have reached an agreement regarding funding for the construction and 
maintenance for the immediate future. The MDA has agreed to fund the construction cost 
of BMD facilities and supporting Aegis components. The U.S. Navy will fund the 
training facility in the United States and the supporting facilities for personnel in 
Romania and Poland.89 Each organization has also produced cost estimates for the near 
future. The U.S. Navy has projected a combined cost of $155M for manning, supporting 
and operating the European sites over the next four fiscal years. The MDA has stated that 
it will contribute roughly $82M toward the operating and support of the Aegis Ashore 
sites and training facility over the same time period. The Navy and MDA have decided to 
produce a joint cost estimate for a 25-year operating cycle, but have not released a 
timeline for completion.90 The Aegis Ashore test site at Pacific Missile Range Facility 
(PMRF) in Kauai, Hawaii has become operational and completed a successful test 
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intercept on May 20, 2014.91 As more testing is conducted, any setback could have a 
direct effect on the forward stationed Aegis Ashore sites. 
As Phase II of the EPAA is underway, it is possible that budgeting and accounting 
have taken a backseat to the deployment and employment of forces overseas. While these 
actions have allowed the executive branch and DOD to meet the deadlines outlined 
during the announcement of the EPAA, there will be constraints going forward requiring 
the reallocation of funds. As an example, THAAD has been listed as a ready asset in the 
EPAA, but there are have not been any studies conducted for proposed sites and 
associated funding required.92 The GAO has identified the lack of long term cost 
estimates by MDA, but this action alone is unlikely to change business practices within 
the MDA. As per the Chief Financial Officer of the DOD, outlined in the Defense Budget 
Summary for FY15, the MDA has been afforded $7.5B for 12 months of operating, 
researching, testing, developing and employing missile defense assets to defend the U.S. 
homeland.93 This agency’s budget pales in comparison to the overall DOD budget 
request of nearly $500B, but when combined with allocations from other branches the 
MDA remains a bulky sector of defense spending. 
B. PLATFORM AVAILABILITY AND COSTS 
The increased need for BMD platforms is being balanced against the U.S. 
military’s need to conduct other combat missions under the fiscal oversight of the U.S. 
congress. The individual services contribute differently to the deployment of sensors, 
interceptors and command and control assets. While BMD is not a top priority for any 
specific branch, it remains key to allocation of current and future funding. The U.S. Navy 
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has traditionally lobbied for increased SM-3 inventory and Aegis ships. The U.S. Army 
considers ground based and THAAD as fundamental for ensuring U.S. security interests. 
Last, the U.S. Air Force has supported the role of early warning radars and persistent 
satellite coverage. Each service branch has shaped their organizational values to meet a 
portion of the BMD mission while continuing to battle against competing interests within 
their own services.  
The U.S. Navy contributes to the BMDS with sensors and interceptors onboard 
ships and with Aegis Ashore. Central to any debate within the U.S. Navy is the number 
of ships in the fleet. Since the release of a force structure assessment completed in 2012, 
U.S. Navy proponents have sought to maintain and establish a 306-ship navy.94 
Fortunately for those in favor of the DDG and guided missile cruiser (CG) programs, 
surface patrollers have been central to the BMD mission through the use of the Aegis 
Combat System (ACS).  
There are currently, 85 cruisers and destroyers in the fleet.95 Due to budgetary 
concerns, half of the deployable CGs (22 in active service) are entering a layup phase and 
will not be at sea for a portion of the next decade.96 The cruisers will return to operational 
status as older cruisers are decommissioned starting in FY2019. This adjustment is 
necessary to prolong the lifecycle and availability of cruisers. While these ships will not 
be in active duty, the number of Aegis BMD capable CGs will continue to be counted as 
part of the BMD force structure. The DDG program has continued to receive funding for 
the planned construction of 2 DDGs each year for the next five years.97 These DDGs are 
slated to be equipped with the ACS and thus BMD capable. 
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 Of the 85 ships in the fleet, currently only 30 are BMD capable. There are 16 
BMD ships stationed in the Pacific with the remaining number in the Atlantic region.98 
The current outline provided by MDA projects the number of BMD capable ships 
through FY2019 at 43.99 This number of 43 Aegis BMD ships includes four Aegis 
cruisers that could enter a reduced operating status as part of the CG modernization plan. 
Three of these cruisers are stationed in the Pacific. Currently, there is not a plan to 
increase the current number of ships stationed in Rota, Spain. This implies that the BMD 
mission will be fulfilled with the current deployment of four DDGs. There are presently 
five BMD ships stationed with Forward Deployed Naval Forces (FDNF) Yokosuka, 
Japan100 with another three DDGs set to shift homeports from the west and east coasts of 
the United States to FDNF Japan by 2017.101 While this implies the number of BMD 
ships will increase by three, the USS Shiloh was listed on the CG modernization plan and 
will be moved away from FDNF Japan without a stated CG replacement.102 Also, there is 
a permanent BMD test ship that draws from the number of deployable forces. The USS 
Lake Erie was the most recent test ship stationed in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii and is set to be 
replaced by the USS John Paul Jones.103 Without an FDNF station in the 5th Fleet Area 
of Responsibility (AOR), ships will continue to deploy from U.S. homeports, including 
Hawaii and San Diego, in order to fulfill the BMD missions related to Iran. There is a 
constant rebalancing of forces based on mission needs and the limited quantity of forces. 
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After examining the extra responsibilities for BMD ships, the projected 17 ships 
in the Pacific may not be enough. First, three of these ships will enter layup for CG 
modernization bringing the total to 14. Next, one of the ships will support the Missile 
Defense Agency’s (MDA) Integrated Master Test Plan (IMTP), reducing the available 
number to 13. Assuming the FDNF Japan ships do not receive a replacement for USS 
Shiloh, there will be seven BMD ships in Yokosuka, Japan. Hawaii will lose two cruisers 
but gain a test ship, leaving it with four BMD capable ships. This means that there will 
only be three BMD ships left in San Diego, CA. The Hawaii and San Diego ships will 
continue deployments to 5
th
 Fleet in support of BMD and Carrier Strike Group (CSG) 
operations at an increased tempo due to the loss of one BMD ship from the Atlantic. 
While it may appear that the Pacific region has more assets than those charged with the 
defense of Europe, the EPAA is adding sole purpose sensors and interceptors by 
employing two Aegis Ashore sites.  
Even as the number of Aegis equipped ships is on the rise, there are a limited 
number of SM-3s that provide these ships with an engagement capability. The current 
number of SM-3s in the inventory is 144104 at a price tag between $9M105 and $13M 
each.106 These missiles are distributed between the component commanders by Joint 
Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense (JFCC IMD).107 The 
missiles are needed aboard ships for real world events but also needed for future testing 
in scenarios for system certification. The MDA has already lowered its requested budget 
for missile procurement significantly between FY14 and FY15. The FY15 budget request 
results in a total of 543 SM-3s procured (used for testing, inventory and aboard ships) by 
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FY2019, which is 132 fewer than requested under the FY14 budget.108 SM-3s are being 
fielded in differing increments across the globe while testing is ongoing. As production 
continues in the United States, the Japanese have stepped up production of SM-3s at their 
own domestic facilities.109 The Japanese Self Defense Force (JSDF) is well aware of 
current lack of missiles and is working to establish their independent security 
architecture. 
The Aegis Ashore sites in Europe will require 24 SM-3s each, which will tip the 
scales in favor of EUCOM in the quest for garnering limited SM-3s.110 The incremental 
deployment of SM-3s is based upon the funded amount, the requested amount and the 
perceived threat. Without the ability to foresee testing failures, leading to recall and on-
site repair of deployed assets, the fleet is expected to receive 267 missiles for inventory 
by FY2019.111 Assuming the Aegis Ashore sites utilize 24 interceptors each, there would 
be 219 SM-3s available for ships at sea. If the test ship employs at the most five missiles 
for testing, then there would be 214 missiles available. If the remaining missiles are 






 fleet would receive 71 missiles 
each. There are risks to placing too many missiles onboard any one ship, so if they were 
divided evenly amongst the FDNF ships in Japan (seven ships not including USS Shiloh), 
each ship would receive 10 missiles. If some missiles were left in reserve for reload 
capability then each ship could receive eight with 22 in reserve. This would leave 
missiles for a possible surge from Hawaii or San Diego in the event of hostilities. When 
compared to the missile inventories of Iran and North Korea, it is evident that if SM-3s 
are necessary for defense the efficient use of these missiles should be a top priority.  
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While the use of SM-3s and Aegis has been steadfast, Sea Based X-band radar 
(SBX) is increasingly controversial due to reliability and sustainability concerns. The 
SBX is a massive X-band radar stationed atop a mobile drilling platform. The platform 
was transitioned to the Military Sealift Command (MSC) in 2012 while the mission 
package and radar remain under the command of the MDA. Due to budget concerns and 
increased maintenance costs, the MDA has placed the SBX into a reduced operational 
status. The SBX can still be sent to sea in the event of probable missile launch, but will 
otherwise be used for testing of the BMDS on a limited basis. This move will save the 
MDA $670M over the next five years. The reduced operations will place the burden of 
sensor coverage on FDNF Japan ships and Cobra Dane in Alaska.112 The high fidelity 
tracking and mobility of SBX make it ideal for tracking a threat across the Pacific Ocean 
while providing cue data to GBIs. In 2011, MDA affirmed that the BMDS can continue 
to function without SBX and that the threat requiring the capabilities of SBX does not yet 
exist in North Korea.113 SBX remains a necessary part of the BMDS providing sensor 
coverage across the vast expanse of the Pacific.  
The U.S. Army’s stake in the BMD mission is also involves sensors and 
interceptors. THAAD has taken a leading role in the BMD discussion as a readily 
available asset capable of defending critical infrastructure or forward deployed troops.114 
Recent budget approvals have brought the deployable number of THAAD batteries to 
four, with plans for two more to be completed in the next 24 months.115 The batteries are 
stationed in Fort Bliss Texas. To date, only a single battery has conducted a rapid 
deployment.  
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A THAAD battery has been stationed in Guam since 2012 in response to the 
North Korean missile threat.116 The ongoing temporary assignment has cost unknown 
millions to date in order to defend the U.S. territory of Guam117 with an area equal to 
three times the size of Washington D.C. The mobility of THAAD makes it attractive to 
military planners and legislators alike. The system brings sufficient capability against 
short and intermediate missiles in defense of vital assets at a cost relative to its size. 
When THAAD is mentioned, there is an obligation to mention PAC-3. The PAC-
3 platform is a BMD asset on a smaller scale than THAAD. The PAC-3 provides point 
defense of vital infrastructure such as an individual base, runway or building. The most 
recent iteration of Patriot is readily deployable, available for foreign military sale, 
requires minimal support and proven in combat. Besides the United States, the Patriot 
system has been purchased by six European nations, eight Middle East nations and three 
states in East Asia.118
 
PAC-3 is mentioned as a viable asset in the EPAA, but the GAO is 
quick to point out that the U.S. Army has not conducted financial projections about 
possible deployment sites and associated costs.119 The most recent deployment of PAC-3 
is along the Turkey-Syria border as a NATO effort to prevent stray Syrian missiles from 
entering Turkish air space.120 In the scope of the EPAA, a PAC-3 battery is not a 
fundamental component for the greater security of Europe. The Patriot system is designed 
to defend against short-range ballistic missiles and thus is not justified as part of the 
grander defense architecture to counter an Iranian threat. In this instance, the DOD seems 
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validated in not spending the resources to identify future deployment sites. The PAC-3 is 
capable BMD platform, however, in regards to Iran it is incapable of intercepts.  
Arguably the most successful of the U.S. Army’s contributions to greater BMD is 
the AN/TPY-2. The AN/TPY-2 is a land-based radar capable of detection and tracking of 
all ballistic missile variants. When the AN/TPY-2 is combined with an intercept 
capability it is known as THAAD. The AN/TPY-2 is currently deployed in Qatar, Israel, 
Turkey and Japan.121 Japan is receiving a second radar in southern Japan at the 
Kyogamiskai Japanese Air Self Defense Force Base, providing sensor overlap in the Sea 
of Japan.122 This radar is being stationed in central Japan, alleviating radar stress 
currently placed upon Aegis ships at sea.123
 
At the cost of $172M per unit,124 there are 4 
in active service,125 4 stationed at Fort Bliss in Texas, with another three systems126
 
being 
built. The MDA has confirmed that 12 radars will be built, but does not disclose proposed 
sites or if they will be part of THAAD batteries.127
 
Two other radars are being built as 
part of THAAD batteries in a foreign military sale to the United Arab Emirates.128 
There is a growing movement to place a THAAD unit, using the AN/TPY-2, in 
South Korea to defend U.S. personnel and assets.129 With recent elections and 
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appointment of a new defense minister in the ROK, it seems possible that the United 
States could become more involved in ROK BMD. Defense Minister Han Min-koo has 
recently expressed that he would welcome a THAAD battery in ROK as “helpful to our 
security and defense.”130 The DOD is seeking a foothold in the ROK BMD system and 
hopes to integrate THAAD into the KAMD. While this foreign military sale would be a 
welcome sight for the U.S. DOD, it is receiving reprisal from China. China is already 
suspect of the United States and Japan combined missile defense efforts and is seeking to 
deter ROK from forming a similar partnership with the United States.131 The AN/TPY-2 
has become political and the future addition of radars will have tactical and strategic 
implications.  
The Air Force remains vested in the BMD through their commitment to satellite 
programs and early warning radars. The Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) 
provides overhead infrared tracking and consists of two satellites launched in 2009.132 
The satellites were intended to be the predecessors to the Precision Tracking Space 
System (PTSS) that has since been cancelled. The Air Force currently operates the Cobra 
Dane radar in Alaska, but only has funding for operations through 2015. The MDA and 
U.S. Air Force have not yet agreed upon a replacement plan for Cobra Dane. Cobra Dane 
remains operational with only simulated tracking serving as proof of capability. Due to 
the field of view and budget constraints, Cobra Dane has not tracked a test target since 
2005.133
 
Meanwhile, the MDA and U.S. Air Force continue to share cost in executing the 
upgrades associated with UEWRs in Clear and Cape Cod.134 
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C. COMPLETED AND UPCOMING BMDS TESTING 
The BMDS requires continuous testing and modification to ensure proper 
functionality. Testing of the BMDS can include simulated target tracking, live-fire 
intercepts, verification of data path reliability, coalition capability testing, or a 
combination of multiple systems to achieve successful tracking or intercept. Given the 
wide range of asset capability, budget constraints, and variation amongst threats, the 
MDA seeks maximum efficiency when developing the Integrated Master Test Plan 
(IMTP).135
 
The IMTP is a classified document but a review of recent tests can serve as a 
gauge of current BMDS reliability, highlight failures or successes, and suggest future 
testing requirements. During an April 2, 2014 meeting of the Senate committee on Armed 
Services and Strategic Forces Subcommittee, J. Michael Gilmore, the Director of the 
Operational Test and Evaluation Office of the Secretary of Defense, discussed the recent 
testing events with mixed results. The director’s testimony separated the individual 
progress of Aegis BMD, THAAD, GBI, C2BMC, and Aegis Ashore while forecasting 
upcoming tests.136 
Aegis BMD has been amongst the most reliable of BMD platforms and has 
recorded 28 successful intercepts during 34 total live-fire test intercepts as of July 
2014.137 To provide balance, Director Gilmore makes reference to the last failed SM-3 
test during Flight Test Integrated 01(FTI-01) in October 2012. FTI-01, part of the 
planned tests within the IMTP, was the first test to include THAAD, Aegis, PAC-3 and 
C2BMC simultaneously.138 FTI-01 involved five intercepts all of which were successful 
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with the exception of an SM-3 intercept of a short-range ballistic missile.139
 
Since the 
failure there have been five successful intercepts with the most recent test coming on 
October 3, 2013 in FTM-22.140 The achievements of the SM-3 program has been 
downplayed due to the anomalies encountered with the third stage rocket motor in SM-3 
IA and IB.141
 
Future testing of Aegis BMD has been delayed due to sequestration and 
target availability while procurement of standard missiles continues uninterrupted.  
THAAD has a perfect record of eleven intercepts in eleven attempts since testing 
began in 2006.142 THAAD’s most recent success came as a part of FTI-01. While 
THAAD conducted a successful engagement of a medium range threat, personnel on 
station executed it. The next step for THAAD success is the execution of target kills via a 
remote control through the C2BMC. While this technology is in development, it cannot 
be tested because of funding shortfalls.143 This test record has paved the way for 
procurement of additional batteries including the previous mentioned foreign military 
sale to the United Arab Emirates and Qatar.144 
GBI has had a less than positive track record, but it remains the only system 
declared as capable against an ICBM threat. Since 1999, GBI has performed 17 flight 
tests with 9 confirmed intercepts.145 The successful intercept on June 22, 2014 was the 
first intercept by a GBI since 2008. The GBI program has experienced significant failures 
due to issues in manufacturing the Kill Vehicle which has now been through two 
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iterations: Capability Enhancement 1 (CE-1) and Capability Enhancement II (CE-II). 
FTG-06b utilized an Aegis BMD cue to a GBI equipped with CE-II Enhanced Kill 
Vehicle.146 Further testing is required to determine accurate asset capability and 
reliability. Upcoming GBI testing includes attempting an intercept an ICBM target 
traveling over 5,500 kilometers prior to engagement. This shift in testing is an attempt to 
stress the GMD system and build confidence in the event of real world employment. 
These tests are not cheap, with an estimated price of $70M per GBI,147 not including the 
$18M for each retrofit to the ten existing CE-II equipped GBIs.148 With the proposed 
expansion of the GBI inventory in 2013, from 30 to 44 interceptors at an estimated cost 
of $1B through 2017, testing will be accompanied by the identification of system flaws 
and further improvement to the kill vehicle.149 These modifications will take place as a 
third GBI site is proposed for the east coast.150 
D. FUTURE TECHNOLOGIES 
The validation process for developing technologies is extensive due to the 
responsibility placed on platforms to defend the homeland. The MDA is constantly 
pursuing newer systems. As other nations pursue advanced missile technology, the MDA 
is charged with remaining ahead of the threat in terms of detection, tracking and 
engagement. While some programs have lost funding due to sequestration and 
reallocation of assets, other systems have survived and are progressing toward 
maturation.  
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As a stopgap measure for sensor coverage in the Pacific, the director of the MDA 
has requested approximately $80M for the development of the Long Range 
Discrimination Radar (LRDR).151 While a location has not been disclosed, it will provide 
constant coverage across the Pacific and allow for SBX to enter a reduced operational 
status. MDA has identified a sensor gap and is working to correct the issue and ease the 
stress on forward sensors. 
The U.S. Navy experienced a setback when the SM-3 Block IIB funds were 
reallocated to the GMD CE-II program. During a DOD briefing in 2013, Secretary of 
Defense Hagel announced that the SM-3 IIB program was no longer part of the EPAA.152
 
The funds are now being used to improve the CE-2 Kill Vehicle on the GBIs in order to 
provide a more immediate defense of the United States. The logic is that the SM-3 IIB 
program would not have been fielded until 2022 at the earliest and the threat from Iran 
and North Korea is advancing more rapidly, which then requires a deterrent and 
engagement capability. While a capable GMD force is crucial to a sense of security, the 
SM-3 IIB program could allow for an early intercept capability that does not currently 
exist. The SM-3 IIB would allow Aegis ships to conduct intercepts against ICBMs in the 
post-boost phase prior to a GBI engagement. Early engagement allows for multiple 
engagements, the efficient use of limited GBIs, and further discrimination against 
possible ICBM countermeasures.153
 
While the SM-3 IIB program has been discarded at 
present, the technology could reappear if a new threat emerges. 
The Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) has survived budget cuts and is 
posed to be the radar system deployed on the DDG-51 Flight III. The AMDR is the 
follow on to SPY-1, which was the air, surface and BMD radar on the CG and DDG 
Flight I, II, and IIA ship classes. Raytheon was awarded the contract in 2013 and the 
AMDR is on track for installation in the shipyard in 2019. The AMDR will possess an S-
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band radar for air and missile defense responsibilities as well as an X-band radar for 
surface and horizon search. The current procurement estimate is to maintain 22 radars 
systems for a 40-year life cycle.154 
While the AMDR has survived, the Airborne Laser Test Bed (ALTB) was 
discontinued in 2012. The ALTB used directed energy to engage ballistic missiles in the 
boost phase. In 2010 the ALTB successfully intercepted a short-range missile. This 
success came too late for the ALTB program, which began in 1996 and then was 
transitioned to research and development in 2009 by then Secretary of Defense, Robert 
Gates.155
 
The ALTB is another example of a technology aimed at attacking the ballistic 
missile in the early stages of flight which is advantageous tactically but considerably 
more difficult to execute. The modified Boeing 747 transitioned to the mothball fleet in 
February 2012.156 
The Precision Tracking Space System (PTSS) was designed to give tracking and 
discrimination data through all phases of ballistic missile flight by sharing data through a 
constellation of satellites.157 The PTSS program began in 2009 but was subsequently 
discontinued in 2013 due to budget drawbacks. 
The cancellation of BMD programs does not mean the end of technological 
research. The space program of the MDA is constantly pursuing new means of persistent 
satellite surveillance and tracking. MDA has even attempted to design a surveillance 
system capable of being placed on unmanned aircraft as part of the Airborne Infrared 
System (ABIR).158 
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An assessment of the costs and capabilities of BMD platforms has revealed 
limitations. Testing and budgetary needs have led to a sensor gap in the Pacific; the 
LRDR may or may not be the solution. As funds slow, the testing cycle for SM-3s will 
slow and the delivery of SM-3 Block IB and IIA may be impacted. The DOD will have to 
decide on whether to test or deliver missiles to the Aegis Ashore sites. The funding 
constraints have limited the development of future technology and hampered validation 
of current platforms. Given these restrictions, the best course of action may be to employ 
assets as a deterrent and make adjustments as testing continues. 
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III. POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC CONTRIBUTING FACTORS 
The previous chapter discussed the military factors that will either ease or stall the 
creation of a Pacific Phased Adaptive Approach (PPAA). This chapter will seek to 
understand the domestic and international politics within the United States, Japan and the 
Republic of Korea (ROK) with a focus toward forming a multilateral defense-based 
alliance similar to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Within the United 
States, the Department of Defense (DOD), Department of State (DOS), and the White 
House formulate policy and global strategy. These policies require the financial support 
and treaty consent of the legislative branch. 
The prime impetus for executing the diplomatic portion of the PPAA will come 
from within the United States and might require considerable cooperation and agreement 
between Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK). At the minimum, the PPAA will 
require enhanced bilateral cooperation along existing U.S.-Japan and U.S.-ROK 
alliances. In the best-case scenario, an information sharing agreement between Japan and 
the ROK would allow for increased burden sharing, pooling of resources, and ultimately 
reduced financial strain on the United States. Considering the distrust between the two 
East Asian nations,159 a cooperative alliance would require a substantive contribution 
from the United States as a third party broker. By understanding the current issues 
dividing or motivating the concerned parties, the PPAA can be formulated to better 
utilize diplomatic leverage.  
A. THE PIVOT TO THE PACIFIC 
On November 17, 2011, President Obama declared, “in the Asia Pacific in the 21st 
century, the United States of America is all in.”160 During his address to the Australian 
parliament President Obama outlined his strategic shift away from two wars in Iraq and 
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Afghanistan and toward the Pacific region. He mentions the United States as a “Pacific 
nation” multiple times throughout his speech. The President made several remarks about 
the austere financial circumstances surrounding the United States and specifically the 
military, but stated that corrective measures to reduce spending would not be at the 
expense of security in the Asian theater.161 This speech marked the rebalancing of focus 
and forces toward the Pacific, which has since been named “the Pivot to Asia” or 
“Rebalancing to the Pacific”162 or “The Pacific Pivot.”163  
Since the speech by the Commander-in-Chief in 2011, the DOD has released 
several documents in support of this shift in strategy. Normally, a strategic shift of this 
magnitude would be outlined in the National Security Strategy (NSS). While the NSS is 
required to be submitted by the President to the Congress each year, this has not 
happened as planned. Since 2002, there have only been three NSS submissions with the 
most recent iteration being the National Security Strategy 2010.164 The NSS traditionally 
sets the stage for the National Military Strategy (NMS), which also has not been 
published since 2010. The NMS is designed to state the ways and means by which the 
military will achieve the objectives listed in NSS.165  
Instead of releasing a new NSS or NMS, the executive branch released the 2012 
Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG). The 2012 DSG came only two months after 
President Obama’s speech in Australia. Leon Panetta, then Secretary of Defense, released 
the 2012 DSG as an update to the DOD’s strategic vision while reiterating the President’s 
priorities for the military. The guidance acknowledged the shift in focus toward the Asia 
Pacific and mentioned a recalibration of forces to meet new goals. As the force 
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recalibrates to meet new demands in the Pacific, Secretary Panetta mentions budgetary 
restrictions as an obstacle to achieving success. In the closing remarks, there was a focus 
on efficiency while ensuring success because “we cannot afford to fail.”166 This 
document set the stage for policy shifts throughout the DOD.  
In a follow-up to the 2012 DSG, the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review discussed 
the current state of the U.S. military and factors shaping the force at home and abroad. 
Domestically, the focus of the QDR was resolving fiscal waste to make the military more 
efficient as a whole. Internationally, the opening section of the 2014 QDR lists Iran and 
North Korea as dangerous regimes that threaten the United States. The 2014 QDR builds 
off the 2012 DSG by reinforcing the United States as a “Pacific power” and referring to 
North Korea as a “growing, direct threat to the United States.”167  
In response to unrest in the Asia Pacific, the 2014 QDR makes reference to a 
possible “multilateral security architecture” that is composed of regional actors and 
would be responsible for balancing against aggressors to regional stability.168  This is a 
reference to a possible collection of nations similar to NATO that could manage security 
concerns and further economic development in the region. While there are no multilateral 
defense organizations within the Asia Pacific region, U.S. involvement is aimed at 
strengthening regional partnerships. Specifically, the review highlights the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Defense Ministers Meeting (ADMM) as a tool for 
enhancing security cooperation in the region.169 The ADMM will be discussed in the 
context of diplomacy later in this chapter.  
The 2014 QDR likens Iran to North Korea as both unreliable and unpredictable 
states, both threats requiring BMD efforts. The same report reinforces that U.S. BMD 
efforts are not directed toward Russia and China. The previous sentiment is repeated 
throughout DOD and executive branch material; “today, only Russia and China have the 
                                                 
166 Leon Panetta (Secretary of Defense), “2012 Defense Strategic Guidance,” January 2012, 
http://www.defense.gov/news/defense_strategic_guidance.pdf. 
167 Chuck Hagel, Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington, DC: The Pentagon, 2014), 4, 
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf. 
168 Ibid. 
169 Ibid., 17. 
 48 
capability to conduct a large-scale ballistic missile attack on the territory of the United 
States, but this is very unlikely and not the focus of U.S. BMD.”170 The only defense 
against a Chinese or Russian missile attack is deterrence in the form of U.S. nuclear 
forces. China and Russia have continued to voice concerns about the expansion of missile 
defenses regardless of stated U.S. intentions. In an effort to promote transparency and 
ease tensions, the U.S. submitted regional policy concerns and capabilities of deployed 
units to the 2014 ASEAN Regional Forum Annual Security Outlook.171  
In the closing section of the 2014 QDR, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
General Martin Dempsey, listed 12 priorities for the distribution of forces and BMD met 
multiple objectives including “defense of the homeland, provide a global stabilizing 
presence, counter weapons of mass destruction, and deny an adversary’s objectives.”172  
According to the objectives and threats listed in the 2014 QDR, BMD is a necessary and 
developing warfare area. 
Flowing from the NSS, NMS, and QDR, the DOD then promulgates strategy to 
combatant commanders through the Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF), 
which is classified.173 In all publicly released documents since 2011, the DOD and 
executive branch have stated a clear goal of shifting forces toward the Pacific while 
exercising fiscal responsibility. With strategy in place from the DOD and executive 
branch, policy implementation and execution require simultaneous cooperation between 
the military, congress, and the Department of State. 
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B. CONGRESSIONAL CONCERNS IN THE ASIA PACIFIC 
In the QDR, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel discusses the necessity for 
cooperation between the legislative branch and the military.174 Secretary Hagel is 
referring to the strain placed upon the military to be present abroad as the leading fighting 
force in the globe while continuing to receive less and less funding. The Congress also 
has a role in international efforts both economic and diplomatic. From the economic 
perspective, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is a proposed free trade agreement 
involving 12 nations throughout the Pacific, including the United States.175 While the 
Obama administration is continuing the TPP negotiations, U.S. Congress will eventually 
be responsible for signing any agreement into legislation.176 In a diplomatic sense, the 
U.S. House of Representatives agreed to legislation officially urging the Japanese 
government to “formally acknowledge, apologize, and accept historical responsibility in a 
clear and unequivocal manner for its Imperial Armed Forces’ coercion of young women 
into sexual slavery….”177 The U.S. Congress, divided amongst Democrats, Republicans 
and a small minority of independent representatives, has a powerful role in shaping the 
possibility of multilateral defense cooperation. 
The current rebalancing of forces in the Asia Pacific involves all branches of the 
military and requires approval from the U.S. Congress. The U.S. Congress is required to 
approve funds designated to the DOD for expenditure under the National Defense 
Authorization Act each fiscal year.178 In the ROK, all U.S. forces are being moved from 
bases near the DMZ to ones further south. Also, the DOD is attempting to normalize 
troop deployments by allowing spouses and family members to accompany soldiers 
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overseas. Senators Carl Levin, Jim Webb, and John McCain voiced resentment over the 
concept of normalizing deployments and the possible political and public relation impact 
that could result.179  
By normalizing deployments to the ROK, soldiers and their families benefit as 
much as the military. Instead of a one-year rotation, accompanied soldiers will assume a 
three-year position, thus allowing for familiarization and retention of regional knowledge. 
While families benefit, costs are increased due to increase in infrastructure required to 
sustain military families.180 The political cost is that an increased U.S. military presence 
could be received unfavorably in the ROK which current holds the Obama administration 
in high regard.181 In December 2009, then-Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates signed 
proposed tour normalization policy into effect.182 To counter this rise in expenditures, the 
U.S. Congress passed the 2013 National Defense Authorization Act (NDDA) prohibiting 
the distribution of funds to efforts contributing to tour normalization.183  
That same NDDA legislation included further expenditures for troop relocation 
from near the DMZ to one of two force concentration areas in South Korea. By 2017, 
19,000 U.S. soldiers will have relocated from near the Demilitarized Zone to either Osan 
in the west or Daegu in the southeast. The move will cost the United States over $9B 
while the ROK’s portion is rising over $4B.184  This movement of forces is part of a 
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larger transition from U.S. to ROK wartime operational control of forces that is currently 
undergoing debate.  
Just as in the ROK, U.S. military forces are being repositioned throughout Japan. 
In May 1, 2006 the Security Consultative Committee produced the “United States-Japan 
Roadmap for Realignment Implementation” in which U.S. forces will return land and 
facilities to Okinawa starting in 2014 and moving through 2028 or after.185 The 
realignment comes as the U.S. adds forces in other nations throughout the Asia Pacific 
and Japan increases defense spending. The realignment is meant to better the domestic 
political environment in Japan, maintain U.S. forces in Japan, and affirm the U.S.-Japan 
alliance.186 Congress has remained skeptical about the financial projections of the 
realignment costs but is currently funding the process.187 
Besides funding defense initiatives, the U.S. Congress has taken steps to advance 
free trade agreements with Japan and Korea. On October 12, 2011 the U.S. Congress 
signed into law the United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement and it went into effect on 
March 15, 2012.188 Japan and the United States do not have a free trade agreement but 
are currently negotiating the TPP. Members of the U.S. Congress have lodged complaints 
against Japan becoming a TPP member because of Japan’s unwillingness to remove 
tariffs on farm products.189 While the U.S. Trade Representative conducts negotiations 
on behalf of the U.S. President under the trade promotion authority granted to the 
president by Congress, this expired in 2007 and is up for renewal in both houses of 
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congress.190 This legislature could become earmarked with requirements for Japanese 
concessions as part of the TPP. 
Lastly, the U.S. Congress can have a positive or negative impact on the 
diplomatic efforts necessary to bring about cooperative agreements. In August 2014, a 
congressional race in Virginia sparked a debate about the naming convention of the Sea 
of Japan, also known as the East Sea in the ROK. In order to garner votes in a district 
with a number of South Korean immigrants, a candidate endorsed support for bill that 
request state schools teach both naming conventions for the body of water between Japan 
and the Korean peninsula. Similar bills have since been introduced in other states while 
receiving negative attention from the Japanese community.191 This minute example of 
congressional involvement can manifest itself at higher diplomatic levels. 
Other congressional representatives have taken interest in the U.S.-Japan-ROK 
alliance as key to success in the Asia Pacific. U.S. House Representative Diana DeGette 
was a member of a 2014 congressional delegation to Japan that aimed at forming 
relationships with members of the Diet (Japanese congress). Representative DeGette 
voiced the opinion that “as members of Congress, we are very concerned about 
strengthening the trilateral relationship.”192 DeGette’s opinion was echoed by other 
members of the delegation while in the presence of U.S. ambassador to Japan, Caroline 
Kennedy, and elected officials of the Diet. Similar efforts to foster the development of 
diplomatic relations will have to be recreated to ease the process of achieving trilateral 
cooperation. 
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C. DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS IN THE ASIA PACIFIC 
Recent events in the Asia Pacific have created a dynamic environment that could 
end either favorably or unfavorably for the United States. As a single example, the U.S.-
ROK relationship is under a period of transformation stemming from the transition of 
operational control of ROK military forces from U.S. command to ROK command. In 
Japan, under the Abe administration, the concept of self-defense in the Japanese 
constitution has been reinterpreted to include the defense of U.S. forces. These issues, 
amongst others, will define diplomatic efforts in the near future.  
Since 1953, the United States has maintained operational control of the ROK 
military forces. After an agreement reached in 2007, the United States had planned to 
return operational control of South Korean forces, but the DPRK took multiple 
aggressive steps in 2012 and 2013 that have disrupted this timeline. After an April 2014 
meeting between both heads of state, the transfer has been delayed until 2015 at the 
earliest and more likely not until sometime during the 2020s.193 The delay is partly due to 
the ROK’s implementation of air defense, missile defense, and early warning systems.194 
As of April 2014, President Park stated, “Korea and the United States have decided that 
the basic direction should be to strengthen the KORUS, combine the defensive 
posture.”195 
While U.S.-Korea relations are undergoing change, the U.S.-Japan relationship 
also remains fluid. During the “2+2 Consultative Meetings in 2013,” Secretary of State 
John Kerry and Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel met with the Prime Minister and 
Defense Minister of Japan. The talks concerned the revision of 1997 Guidelines for U.S.-
Japan Defense Cooperation.196 The ultimate goal of the meeting was to increase relations 
and move closer to a seamless working relationship between the United States and Japan. 
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As a byproduct of the bilateral agreement, the United States is hoping that the Japanese 
Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) will be more welcoming to defense cooperation with other 
regional partners. An interim report covering the results of the meeting states that “the 
two governments will promote bilateral and multilateral security and defense cooperation 
with regional allies and partners.”197 A multilateral defense agreement of any substantive 
power would be between the United States, Japan and the Republic of Korea. The more 
likely defense partnership would be a coalition of smaller Asian nation states that would 
slowly acquire the support of larger nations, similar to the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN). 
In a move to gain diplomatic leverage in the Asian theater, the U.S. has taken an 
interest in ASEAN. ASEAN is committed to economic growth throughout the Asia 
Pacific region while working toward the goals of peace, stability, and integration.198 
ASEAN can be compared to a regional version of the United Nations or European Union. 
The current ASEAN vision is primarily economic but recently took a step toward defense 
priorities with the creation of the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting (ADMM).  
The first ADMM took place in 2006 with all ASEAN member states represented. 
The ADMM then expanded to include members whom are not ASEAN members under 
the title of ADMM Plus. The ADMM Plus has since grown to include eight “dialogue 
partners,” namely Russia, Japan, South Korea, China, Australia, New Zealand, India and 
the United States.199 These meetings have been primarily focused on non-controversial 
topics that allow for healthy relationship building; whereas on difficult defense issues 
“tangible progress has been scant.”200 Militarily or diplomatically, an Asian version of 
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NATO would be able to better balance against Russia, China, or North Korean 
aggression. The current U.S. posture toward China is built on “sustained and substantive 
dialogue.”201 This posture is a work in progress, but would benefit from the support of a 
defense-oriented multilateral organization.  
For now, the United States will utilize the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) to 
press diplomatic initiatives. On August 10, 2014, Secretary Kerry led the U.S. delegation 
to the 21
st
 meeting of the ARF. His goals were to support the initiatives of preventative 
diplomacy, maritime security, disaster relief, counterterrorism, and nonproliferation.202 
Positive diplomatic interaction such as the ARF assists the United States in building 
enduring relations. These discussions set the basis from which to engage in more serious 
debate; such as ballistic missile defense in regards to a DPRK threat. 
D. JAPANESE POLITICAL CONCERNS 
Japan is currently experiencing a period of stability in domestic politics. The 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) elected Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in December 2012. 
This is favorable and problematic for the United States, but positive on the whole. The 
previous decade had been marked by political turmoil and general unrest regarding the 
U.S.-Japan relationship.203 Prime Minister Abe currently supports U.S. military 
involvement in Japan and expansion of trade agreements, but holds nationalistic views 
that are detrimental to relationships with regional partners, including the ROK.204 
Japan joined the 12 nation negotiations for the TPP in July 2013.205 Under Prime 
Minister Abe, Japan has sought to revitalize its economy to include free trade 
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agreements. Even though Japan appears to be more progressive under the current 
administration, it has effectively stalled the TPP talks because of an inability to sign off 
on concessions regarding food staples such as beef and rice.206 The United States made 
an effort to expedite negotiations including a meeting between President Obama and 
Prime Minister Abe in April 2014 to discuss bilateral issues including the TPP. 
Unfortunately it appears that this meeting did little to progress the economic agreement. 
President Obama is hopeful that the TPP can move forward by the end of 2014, but other 
member nations are stalling until Japan and the United States can reach agreement on 
agricultural products. The most recent high-level talks took place by phone on October 
14, 2014 but were also unsuccessful.207 Japan is simultaneously engaged in an ASEAN 
based FTA. The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) is smaller in 
scale, includes China while excluding the United States, and is thus more agreeable to 
Japanese tariff demands.208 If Japan is able to conclude negotiations in the RCEP there 
may be less ambition to complete the complex TPP agreement.  
To further economic progress, Japan has been active in the diplomatic arena. 
Prime Minister Abe has traveled throughout Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Europe to 
enhance diplomatic ties and further economic expansion.209 While Abe is pushing to 
expand Japan’s global influence, regional politics are the primary and immediate 
concern. Prime Minister Abe published a document depicting his goals for foreign policy 
in the Asia Pacific. In “Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond,” Abe describes India, 
Australia, Japan and the United States working to maintain political balance against 
Chinese aggression and securing maritime commons.210 While the essence of this policy 
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is favorable to the United States, it intentionally discounts the contributions of the ROK. 
The less than favorable stance toward the ROK is not limited to this document.  
Since Abe has taken office he has yet to meet with either the Chinese or South 
Korean Prime Ministers. He has drawn heavy criticism for his revisionist positions that 
downplay the atrocities committed by imperial Japan throughout the region. Specifically, 
PM Abe and members of his cabinet continue to visit the Yasukuni Shrine.211 The Shinto 
shrine is home to the spirits of soldiers that fought during World War II, including the 
enshrinement of several who were convicted of war crimes. The PM has stated that he is 
simply honoring those who fought for the nation. Critics say that he could visit the 
Chidorigafuchi National Cemetery to accomplish the same goal without offending the 
United States and regional neighbors.212  
A meaningful point of contention between the Abe administration and the ROK is 
the topic of comfort women. During the 1930s and 1940s the Japanese military enslaved 
Korean women as prostitutes for soldiers in Japanese controlled territories. In 1993, the 
Japanese government issued an official apology for the mistreatment of all women 
affected by Japanese mistreatment; including Koreans. This press release, by then Chief 
Cabinet Secretary Kono, has since been called the Kono statement.213 PM Abe has taken 
steps to enflame relations with the ROK by making mention of the validity of the 
statement or even possibly reversing the statement.214 At the urging of the United States, 
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PM Abe has stated that he would abide by the 1993 Kono statement.215 PM Abe’s 
reluctance is not limited to the issue of comfort women. 
The ROK has continued to make mention of Japan’s inability to correctly 
understand the history of imperial Japan. The ROK is quick to note that textbooks in 
Japanese schools still have revisionist teachings of treatment of foreigners during 
Japanese expansion that glorify grotesque acts.216 Meanwhile there are small islands in 
the Sea of Japan (called the East Sea in the ROK) that are disputed between the two 
nations, referred to as the Liancourt Rocks by the United States.217 These small points of 
contention have been roadblocks to making substantive progress on larger issues of 
importance to the United States.218  
Lastly, Abe has used the Six Party Talks (SPT) to advance domestic concerns 
about Japanese civilians abducted by North Korea. The current administration is in 
bilateral negotiations with the DPRK concerning the return of abducted Japanese persons 
in return for lessening of economic sanctions.219 This move by Abe is counter to the 
united front presented in the SPT in hopes of deterring the DPRK from advancing missile 
and nuclear technology. Abe campaigned under the promise of doing more to ensure the 
safe return of abducted people and his unilateral actions could increase his popularity 
domestically, but hinder foreign policy issues. 
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E. THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA POLITICAL CONCERNS 
The Republic of Korea is home to over 25,000 U.S. soldiers and constitutes the 
sixth largest trading partner with the United States. The ROK is the third largest economy 
in the Asia Pacific and is neighbor to the most unpredictable nation on Earth, North 
Korea.220 Under the Park administration, the ROK’s primary concern is maintaining an 
open dialogue with the DPRK, working toward unification on a democratic basis while 
preventing an aggressive, nuclear North Korea from destabilizing the region.221 The 
ROK is contending with powerful economies and militaries in neighboring states. 
Meanwhile, the ROK is under pressure from China to lessen military ties with the United 
States and the United States is encouraging increased partnership with Japan.222 
Relations between the ROK and Japan in the last 24 months have been less than positive 
with little sign of improving. Given the fragility of the ROK’s position in relation to 
multiple nations, the ROK could serve as the linchpin for establishing a defensive 
alliance in the Asia Pacific.  
As previously mentioned the United States and the ROK are undergoing talks 
concerning troop realignment and the transition of operational control of ROK forces, but 
these are there are other issues dividing the international partners. The United States and 
the ROK have yet to settle on a nuclear materials agreement.223 The two nations initially 
agreed to a civil nuclear cooperation agreement known as the 123 Agreement in 1972.224 
The agreement is mutually beneficial, as U.S. nuclear reactors require parts produced in 
the ROK and the ROK is dependent upon the United States for nuclear material. The crux 
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of the debate centers on the ROK’s desire to manage nuclear material from the start to 
finish of the production cycle, and lessen dependence on the United States. The United 
States has never allowed for allies to control the full cycle of nuclear materials, because 
of proliferation concerns.225 The ROK is showing little signs of lessening nuclear 
technology advances and has recently agreed to build four nuclear power reactors for the 
United Arab Emirates at a cost of $20B.226 Any future agreement needs to benefit the 
ROK’s nuclear program while limiting the United States susceptibility to criticism from 
nuclear nonproliferation organizations. 
During President Obama’s trip to Seoul in 2014, ROK’s President Park mutually 
agreed that there was a need to improve upon trilateral information sharing between the 
ROK, Japan and the United States.227 The same views were expressed in a joint 
statement after a meeting of U.S.-ROK defense ministers and head diplomats:  
The Ministers recognized that trilateral security cooperation between the 
United States, the ROK, and Japan strengthens deterrence against the 
North Korean threat and expressed their intention to expand trilateral 
security cooperation and coordination….228 
As the ROK continues to improve in its defensive bilateral cooperation with the 
United States and purchases platforms such as the Global Hawk229 and F-35 Joint Strike 
Fighter230, they could gain a valuable force multiplier by choosing to enhance 
cooperation with Japan. The Japan-ROK portion of a trilateral BMD agreement could 
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reduce the cost of platform testing and acquisition while information sharing could result 
in more efficient use of BMD platforms. The additional benefits of a trilateral agreement 
will be discussed in the following chapter. 
Since 2003, in another move to increase regional involvement, the ROK has been 
dedicated to engaging in more free trade agreements. The ROK has concluded 
agreements with the United States, Chile, Singapore, India, and Peru.231 The ROK has 
also signed free trade agreements with economic organizations such as the ASEAN, EU 
and EFTA.232 Meanwhile, an unlikely association is under negotiation that would unite 
Japan, China and the ROK in a free trade agreement.233 This FTA has the attention of the 
United States because it would create an agreement binding twenty percent of the world’s 
economy.234 It seems that in this case, the three Asian states can put aside resentments to 
create a union that would mutually benefit all parties. The ROK is edging toward joining 
TPP negotiations, but must first formally request to join the partnership and be accepted 
by all current member states.235 The addition of the ROK to the TPP could further delay 
the already slow process currently being stymied by Japan and U.S. concerns. 
In relation to the DPRK, the ROK’s President Park Geun-hye has sought to better 
communications by disassociating economic and humanitarian relief from diplomatic acts 
and military deterrence. President Park has made it clear that a nuclear North Korea will 
not be tolerated, which has the full support of the U.S.-ROK alliance, but that aggressive 
acts by the DPRK will not deter relief operations or dialogue.236 President Park has 
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adopted a “trustpolitik” stance that is flexible to the situation but not identical to the 
foreign policy of the United States.237 This stance has not yet become a hindrance to the 
United States politically or militarily. 
A hindrance toward trilateral negotiation is the strained ROK-Japan relationship. 
Previous portions of this chapter have detailed the topics of comfort women, territorial 
disputes, and revisionist teachings. In a Liberation Day speech, President Park Geun-hye 
remarked, “we have been demanding (the Japanese side) change its stance and take steps 
acceptable for former comfort women while they are alive.”238 The territorial dispute 
seems to be a long way away from resolution and steps need to be taken in other forums 
prior to reaching any kind of agreement. While revisionism has created a rift in the ROK-
Japan association, Park remains optimistic saying, “both South Korea and Japan have to 
look over the next 50 years and work to develop a future-oriented, friendly and 
cooperative relationship.”239 There are relatively simple steps that can be taken to 
improve relations between the two nations, but it is unknown whether or not nationalistic 
pride will continue to diminish the possibility of regional cooperation. 
F. SUMMARY 
The political, legislative, and diplomatic spheres in the Asia Pacific are dynamic. 
The President of the United States has made the Asia Pacific a priority. The military 
strategy produced under DSG 2012 requires action by multiple branches of government. 
As the United States increases its area of influence it must work with regional allies, such 
as Japan and the ROK. The United States must recognize the individual domestic and 
international concerns of these independent states. Japan and the ROK, while regional 
neighbors, have a long history that is susceptible to inflammation and is currently tenuous 
at best. The defense and diplomatic goals of the United States will require coordination. 
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To successfully achieve a PPAA the United States will have to serve as a third-party 
broker capable of negotiating an agreement appealing to all parties. 
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE PPAA 
After underlining the current fiscal constraints encountered by the U.S. 
Department of Defense (DOD), reviewing the national strategic aims of the United 
States, and discussing the political atmospheres in Japan and the Republic of Korea 
(ROK), evidence supports planning the Pacific Phased Adaptive Approach (PPAA) with 
separate defense and diplomatic objectives. The PPAA can be executed under current 
information sharing agreements and bilateral treaties. Under the PPAA, the U.S. DOD 
will continue current efforts but increase platform deployments in the Asia Pacific region; 
similar to the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA). The aim of diplomatic 
efforts will be to create a multilateral defense-based agreement led by the United States 
that includes Japan and the ROK. A multilateral agreement would allow the states to 
share existing defense platforms, intelligence, and in the development of future 
technologies thus lessening the financial cost to each nation. The overall goal of the 
PPAA is to achieve a multilateral ballistic missile defense (BMD) system in the Pacific to 
counter a possible ballistic missile strike by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
(DPRK). 
A. THE PACIFIC PHASED ADAPTIVE APPROACH 
The initial phases of the PPAA will deploy current systems and technologies 
already in use. Later phases will require the installation of forward based sensors and 
interceptors with the operation of technologies under development. The most difficult 
aspect of the PPAA calls for an information sharing agreement to unite missile defense 
capabilities. This agreement is desired, but it is not required. If an agreement could be 
reached then Japan, Korea, and the United States could share military resources and 
critical, sensitive data. The data would be shared through C2BMC nodes. Theses nodes 
could be installed in respective allied command and control (C2) centers, but would first 
require cooperation between tense neighbors. The C2BMC nodes can be installed at any 
phase of the PPAA because computer terminals and associated software are miniscule in 
comparison to naval ships or THAAD batteries. The execution of the PPAA can proceed 
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without improving relations between Japan and the ROK, but without an agreement the 
United States would solely pay for the PPAA. An agreement would ultimately reduce the 
financial stress on all involved states. Finally, the PPAA assumes consent of the U.S. 
Congress to use expenditures aimed at improving the regional defense of allies and 
forward deployed U.S. military forces, deterring rogue states, and defending the U.S. 
homeland.  
1. Phase 1 
The first step will be to increase the number of U.S. BMD ships in the Asia 
Pacific. The United States has five BMD ships, stationed in Japan, capable of tracking 
and intercepting missiles with a plan to add three more by 2017.240241 While not part of 
the PPAA, it is worth note that the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) has 
six ships with tracking and intercept capability with a plan to deploy two more by 
2020.242 The ROK Navy (ROKN) has three ships capable of detecting but not 
intercepting ballistic missiles, with a plan to purchase three more.243  
The next step is to bring the southern Japan AN/TPY-2 radar online. The United 
States currently operates an AN/TPY-2 radar in Shariki, Japan, with the second radar to 
come online by the end of 2014. The radar is being deployed to Kyogamisaki, Japan, in 
an effort to provide comprehensive radar coverage of the Sea of Japan from the south.244 
These sensors can share tracking data with interceptors to defend Japan and communicate 
with the U.S. BMDS to provide early warning of a threat to the U.S. homeland. When 
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both a city's name and that city's state or country's name are mentioned together, the state 
or country's name is treated as a parenthetical element. 
The third step is to make the THAAD battery in Guam a permanent station. A 
THAAD battery has been deployed to Guam since 2012. The goal of permanent 
stationing will be to increase BMD readiness by maintaining expert personnel on station 
for longer rotations. Instead of year-long rotations, service members would conduct 
multi-year accompanied tours. Army personnel currently operating on deployed status 
would be phased out over the upcoming 24 months as permanent housing and facilities 
are established at existing U.S. bases. This move would solidify BMD planning for Guam 
while sending a strong political message of commitment to the Asia Pacific at a relatively 
low cost.  
Last, the GBI expansion project currently underway will be folded into Phase 1. 
The additional procurement of GBIs for Fort Greely, Alaska has already been announced 
by the Obama administration and subsequently funded by dollars intended for the 
cancelled SM-3 Block IIB program.245 14 additional GBIs will raise the total to 44 GBIs 
by 2017.246 The GBIs will serve as a deterrent and defense against a DPRK missile attack 
and can thus be justified as essential to the PPAA. 
The first phase of the PPAA utilizes programs and actions already in motion but 
binds them together to form a coherent plan. The first phase requires announcements by 
officials but little in the form of new funding. This phase is filled with easily attainable 
goals that will build momentum for the more difficult phases to follow. 
2. Phase 2 
The first step in Phase 2 is to deploy THAAD to Busan on a permanent basis. 
Previous sections discussed the ongoing debate within the ROK concerning BMD 
systems and hinted at the possibility of U.S. BMD platforms in the ROK. Under phase 2, 
a THAAD battery will deploy to Busan, ROK to be operated by U.S. forces. Busan is in 
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the southeastern most portion of the ROK. If a foreign military sale can be agreed upon, 
the THAAD battery will be turned over to the ROK Army. A THAAD battery in Busan, 
ROK will provide missile defense of key U.S. and ROK military installations. This 
protection will be increasingly important after the U.S. base realignment is complete. 
Once U.S. forces are withdrawn from near the DMZ and placed into the two base 
concentration areas, U.S. installations could be an easier target for a DPRK missile 
attack. THAAD has been proven to be effective at intercepting the medium and 
intermediate range missiles capable of reaching the southern tip of the ROK from the 
DPRK. 
Given the attention and publicity of the EPAA, it can be assumed that the four 
BMD ships deployed to Rota, Spain are currently equipped to defend European allies at a 
higher level than other regions; thus carrying a significant number of SM-3s. While BMD 
ships continue to deploy to the Persian Gulf in defense of allies against an Iranian threat, 
Middle East states have begun to acquire their own BMD assets.247 UAE and Qatar have 
purchased THAAD from the United States.248 As partners take responsibility for their 
own defense, the burden on SM-3s in 5
th
 Fleet is lessened.249 Simultaneously, Aegis 
Ashore will come online in Romania and Poland, lessening the need for SM-3s on ships, 
but raising the overall number of SM-3s in the region. Without a published plan for 
permanent land based interceptors, Pacific Command, specifically 7
th
 fleet, needs to 
become the top priority for the distribution of SM-3s. 
The second step in Phase 2 is the redistribution of SM-3s on a 3-1-1 basis. The 3-







 fleet respectively. The actual distribution of SM-3s is classified. Under 
a 3-1-1 plan, 7
th





 fleet BMD ships. As previously mentioned, the fleet is expected to receive 267 SM-3s 
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for inventory. If 48 SM-3s are distributed to Aegis Ashore in EPAA and 4 are sent to the 
test ship, then 215 SM-3s will be divided amongst BMD ships worldwide. With a 3-1-1 
plan, 129 SM-3s with be sent to 7
th







 Fleet maintains the projected 7 BMD ships in Japan, then each ship 
could be equipped with 18 missiles on an even distribution or over 20 per ship dependent 
on ship maintenance or reserve planning. The increase in available ships and missiles 
provides greater flexibility in planning while projecting power throughout the Pacific. 
Phase 2 marks the first new movement of forces. There will be significant 
regional reaction to deploying THAAD to the ROK, but the PRC can be reassured of its 
limited capability and lack of capability against PRC missile threats. If the ROK is 
hesitant about domestic reaction, then the United States can deploy THAAD purely for 
the defense of U.S. interests and personnel. The 3-1-1 distribution of SM-3s could be 
made public in the PPAA, but the actual distribution of missiles aboard ships will remain 
classified. The announcement of moving missiles to the Asia Pacific will send a strong 
message of commitment to U.S. regional interests. 
3. Phase 3 
The first step of phase three is to improve sensor coverage across the Pacific by 
stationing the Sea-Base X-band (SBX) radar at the island of Midway. The SBX is 
currently in a limited availability status due to financial restrictions. SBX remains 
available for critical missions and BMDS testing. The role of a floating radar platform 
could be fulfilled by BMD ships stationed in San Diego or land-based radars. SBX plays 
a key role in the Ground Based Midcourse Defense (GMD). If SBX’s role is becoming 
more and more limited it should be eliminated from GBI testing and deployed for active 
duty until it is re-tasked, upgraded, or decommissioned. Due to geographic location, 
Midway would allow for tracking and detection of threats aimed at the Hawaiian Islands 
or the west coast of the United States.  
The next step will close sensor gaps in the Pacific by activating the Long Range 
Discrimination Radar (LRDR). As previously discussed, the LRDR is in the procurement 
and developmental stage. Although a permanent location has not been finalized, it will 
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likely be stationed in the Aleutian Islands to provide maximum coverage of the northern 
and central Pacific. By the end of the decade, this land-based radar will provide 
continuous sensor coverage across the central Pacific.  
The final step of Phase 3 is to deploy Aegis Ashore to the west coast of Honshu, 
preferably to the Noto Peninsula.250 Honshu is mainland Japan, extending from 
Hiroshima in the south to Akita in the north. Honshu is the most populous portion of 
Japan and contains Tokyo, Yokohama, Kyoto, Nagoya, Misawa, Kawasaki, and Osaka. 
This step mimics portions of phase 2 and 3 of the EPAA. Aegis Ashore brings sensor and 
intercept capability on a permanent, continuous basis. This move will require 
considerable cooperation from Japan, but is well within the range of possibility. As of 
August 9, 2014, the Defense Ministry of Japan has already hinted at deploying a version 
of Aegis Ashore with land based SM-3s.251 Aegis Ashore could provide BMD for the 
majority of the Honshu plain and early warning of threats heading toward Hawaii or the 
continental United States. 
Aegis Ashore in Japan would have multiple effects. First, fewer ships would be 
dedicated to the BMD of the Honshu plain. This means that navy ships could return to 
being multi-mission platforms vice point defense assets. Next, given the increased 
intercept capability of SM-3 Block 2A, BMD ships will require fewer SM-3s and have 
more available space for SM-2s. The newer SM-3 Block IIA missiles would be 
distributed to Aegis Ashore while the older SM-3 Block IA/IB missiles would be 
deployed to the BMD ships for flexible, alert use. 
Phase 3 will improve sensor coverage across the Pacific for regional and 
homeland defense. The deployment of new systems will increase the timeline for 
engagement due to maximum tracking and detection of missile threats. By lessening the 
need for SM-3 missiles at sea in the Pacific, ships will have increased flexibility and 
higher levels of readiness, which give planners the ability to conduct other missions such 
as maritime security. 
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4. Phase 4 
The first step of Phase 4 is to reactivate the SM-3 Block IIB program. As already 
stated, the SM-3 Block IIB program was canceled in March 2013. SM-3 Block IIB was 
originally scheduled for phase 4 of the EPAA, but funding was redirected toward GBI 
improvements. The SM-3 Block IIB, fired from Aegis Ashore, will provide additional 
capability against ICBM threats.252 In conjunction with the activation of the SM-3 IIB 
program, the Aegis Ashore test facility in Hawaii will be made ready for operational use.  
The Aegis Ashore testing facility in Hawaii will enter a limited testing availability 
status. The operational platform will be made available to MDA for testing on limited 
basis; the exact opposite of the current plan for SBX. Equipping Aegis Ashore in Hawaii 
with SM-3 Block IIB would add another layer of protection against an ICBM threat 
bound for the continental United States. This measure allows for multiple intercept 
opportunities vice the current system that consists solely of Ground Based Interceptors 
(GBI) launched from Alaska or California. 
Last, the existing Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) will be 
augmented for persistent overhead coverage of threat regions. The current system 
consists of two satellites that will operate past their intended service life.253 Satellites 
allow for early warning of launches and provide cues to BMDS assets. Effective satellite 
coverage will reduce the need for airborne detection systems such as the aforementioned 
Airborne Infrared (ABIR) drone system. When satellites are able to track missiles during 
the initial phases of flight, BMD ships are able to standoff from launch areas and outside 
the range of enemy threats.  
In Phase 4 the emphasis is building defense in depth. Previous phases increased 
regional defense and sensor coverage across the central Pacific. The last phase improves 
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intercept capability and reinforces a commitment to deploying assets based on known 
threats.  
B. DIPLOMATIC CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE PPAA 
The diplomatic arm of the PPAA will attempt to build on existing mutual defense 
treaties to form a trilateral agreement between the United States, Japan, and the Republic 
of Korea. The purpose of a trilateral agreement is to share resources leading to a cohesive 
regional BMD system. The resources to be shared are sensors, interceptors, and 
communication platforms. Japan could use SM-3s to defend Korean assets, Korean 
sensors could provide early warning to Japanese defenses, and both nations could share 
satellite bandwidth for communications and intelligence gathering. A regional BMD 
architecture in the Asia Pacific also serves as an early warning for defense of the U.S. 
homeland. These diplomatic efforts are not governed by a timeline in congruence with 
the military execution of the PPAA. The proposed measures in this section focus on 
easily identifiable divisive issues and are not intended to be limiting or all encompassing. 
Foreign policy and regional politics are dynamic. Negotiations concerning the PPAA 
would be difficult and require long-term commitment.  
Before a comprehensive alliance can be formed, several areas must be addressed. 
The trilateral agreement could require concessions by all parties. Japan could be required 
to take conciliatory steps to improve relations with the ROK. The ROK could be publicly 
and directly contributing to the defense of Japan. The United States could serve as broker 
for negotiations and may bare the initial financial burden. A trilateral defense agreement 
could benefit all parties, militarily and financially, in the long term. 
1. The United States 
Previous attempts at forming a trilateral defense agreement between the United 
States, ROK and Japan have failed. As recently as June 2014, top defense officials from 
the concerned nations once again stated their mutual desire for close cooperation in 
 73 
opposition to a belligerent DPRK.254 Given the existing U.S.-ROK and U.S.-Japan 
defense treaties, the focus of the United States should be on developing ROK-Japan 
cooperation. The primary bargaining tool for the United States is the combination of 
available technology and funding. 
The military execution of PPAA already deploys U.S. assets within Japan and the 
ROK. These deployments will rely upon bilateral agreements. Each deployed U.S. asset 
will bolster the defense of the host nation. Because the host nation benefits, they will 
incur part of the financial burden. To enhance the incentive to cooperate trilaterally, the 
United States can shoulder the initial cost of asset deployment, agree to train host nation 
services in THAAD and Aegis Ashore employment, and then sell the platforms at 
reduced cost to Japan and the ROK. The alternative is to require host nations to 
contribute financially toward the deployment and maintenance of THAAD in the ROK 
and Aegis Ashore in Japan. If social and historic issues cannot be overcome then 
hopefully a financial incentive will appeal to Japan and the ROK. 
2. Republic of Korea 
President Park could be extend the policy of “trustpolitik” to Japan.255 If Japan is 
willing to apologize for the use of comfort women then the ROK should accept the 
apology. As President Park has been able to separate diplomacy from humanitarian aid 
with the DPRK, Park could then be willing to work with Japan and move past historic 
disputes. With a formal apology on the record, Japan and the ROK could move toward a 
new chapter of cooperation. 
If Japan apologizes for imperial aggression, the ROK could seek the opportunity 
to resolve the Liancourt Rocks dispute. The ROK continues to execute administrative 
control over the islands, Japan has made territorial claims, and the United States has 
remained neutral during the debate. The ROK has refused to take the debate to the 
International Court of Justice as suggested by Japan because previous territorial dispute 
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rulings seem to favor Japan’s current claim.256 Under an optimal circumstance, the 
dispute would be settled bilaterally with ROK maintaining control of the islands and 
Japan gaining economic rights to an area southeast of the islands. The ROK could then 
reduce the economic exclusion zone to the east of the islands, allowing Japan access to 
the natural resources surrounding the islands. This agreement could benefit both nations 
and reduce tensions. 
3. Japan 
The Abe administration could take immediate and lasting steps to overcome the 
negative public opinion of Japan in the ROK. The current administration in Japan could 
put an end to the controversy concerning the use of comfort women during the World 
War II era. A formal and public apology by Prime Minister Abe to President Park 
assuming responsibility for past atrocities would improve relations. The apology could be 
accompanied by financial reparation to those still alive that were affected by the Japanese 
military.  
In an effort to improve U.S.-Japan and Japan-ROK relations, the Japanese 
government could refrain from making ceremonial visits to the Yasukuni shrine. If the 
Diet (Japan’s parliament) adopted a measure citing Chidorigafuchi National Cemetery as 
the national landmark remembering those that died in the service of Japan then it may 
send a strong message from the people of Japan to the ROK. A legally binding statement 
might curb potentially detrimental action by future administrations. 
C. SUMMARY 
The PPAA will utilize diplomatic and military tools to create a unified ballistic 
missile defense in the Asia Pacific. The military portion of the PPAA can begin 
immediately without the creation of additional bilateral or trilateral agreements. In the 
initial phases, the United States will continue the scheduled deployment and activation of 
sensors, interceptors, and communications assets in the Pacific. Later phases will require 
                                                 




additional assets and utilize new technologies to enhance the defense in depth of regional 
allies and the U.S. homeland.  
The diplomatic aspects of the PPAA are not strictly linked to the military goals. 
The ultimate goal of diplomatic efforts is to form a trilateral agreement. The trilateral 
defensive alliance will allow information to be shared freely between the United States, 
Japan, and the ROK. Information sharing leads to cooperative planning and the efficient, 
effective employment of limited resources. While not required, it would ultimately 








The Pacific Phased Adaptive Approach (PPAA) will establish missile defense 
systems in the Asia Pacific to defend regional allies and the U.S. homeland. Based upon 
the inconsistency of relations between the unpredictable, heavily armed regime in North 
Korea and regional neighbors, many of whom are host nations to U.S. military personnel, 
a comprehensive defense architecture should be installed. While the political atmosphere 
remains tenuous between the ROK and Japan, there is agreement concerning the threat of 
North Korean missile and nuclear technology. The United States possess the resources to 
execute the PPAA with existing bilateral U.S.-Japan and U.S.-ROK agreements, 
however, a trilateral defense agreement would greatly decrease the overall cost to the 
United States. If Japan and the ROK are unable to resolve historic grievances then the 
United States will continue executing defense policy while managing multiple defense 
agreements. 
The need for the PPAA arose from the successful launch of a North Korean 
satellite in December 2012. Prior to December 2012, the DPRK had conducted multiple 
failed launches dating back to 1998. Given that the launch was proof of long-range 
ballistic missile capability, the next most concerning topic is the DPRK’s desire to 
become a nuclear power. After confirming multiple nuclear detonations, U.S. intelligence 
officials now believe the DPRK is in possession of an unknown number of nuclear 
weapons. Until the DPRK confirms their ability to miniaturize nuclear material in the 
shape of a warhead that can be placed on ballistic missiles, the global community and 
regional neighbors are should operate as though it has already been achieved. The United 
States and allies should not wait until an attack is in progress to plan for defense. 
In a proactive response to the possibility of an Iranian threat, the United States is 
currently executing the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) under the consent 
of NATO. In 2009, U.S. President Obama announced a four-phase (now three phases) 
introduction of U.S. BMD platforms into Europe to create a missile shield capable of 
destroying inbound missiles launched from Iran. As of November 2014, the United States 
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has deployed BMD ships to Rota, Spain, installed a C2BMC node in Germany, and has 
begun construction of an Aegis Ashore facility in Romania.  
The PPAA will follow a similar route already in use in Europe. Over four phases, 
the United States will introduce sensors, interceptors, and communications assets into the 
Asia Pacific to defend against a North Korean ballistic missile attack. Unlike the NATO 
alliance, Japan and the ROK do not maintain a comprehensive defensive agreement. The 
United States can introduce assets into Japan and the ROK on an independent basis under 
the existing bilateral agreements. If Japan and the ROK could agree upon a defensive 
alliance then the United States could lead in the sharing of resources. The three nations 
could share intelligence, split defensive ship patrols, share the cost of missile production, 
share the cost of BMD system maintenance and split the cost of testing future 
technologies. A multilateral defense agreement would be beneficial for all parties but is 
not necessary for the United States to establish a BMD architecture in the Asia Pacific to 
deter and defend against a North Korean attack. 
The downfall of the PPAA could be its lack of strategic flexibility. The counter to 
an announcement of a long-term BMD strategy in the Asia Pacific would be to continue 
executing U.S. military policy in congruence with U.S. strategic interests. Opponents of 
the EPAA believe that by announcing U.S. defense initiatives it leaves defense officials 
bound to policies and unable to adapt to changing circumstances. When the DOD 
announced it was eliminating the last phase of the EPAA it drew considerable negative 
attention. The Obama administration had to then explain the reason for redistributing 
funds to the GBI program. If the EPAA had not been announced, and simply 
implemented, then a change in plans would not warrant a public explanation by the U.S. 
Secretary of Defense. In this sense, modification to an announced plan draws unnecessary 
criticism and diminishes overall strength. 
The counter to opponents of proclaiming strategic interests is the inherent benefit 
of stated goals. By clearly proposing a plan such as the EPAA, funding and planning 
become more feasible. As part of a larger initiative, budget requests can be combined 
under one request, vice multiple line items that could be subject to individual scrutiny 
and debate. An announcement of such a plan by the President of the United States draws 
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the attention of the international community. The consequences are twofold. First, the 
proclamation draws the support of partner nations. This support carries weight in 
domestic politics and improves the possibility of gaining financial approval in Congress. 
Elected officials in Congress are usually unwilling to draw negative attention through the 
denial of funds beneficial to allied nations. Second, the support expressed by the partner 
nation is seen by surrounding nations and other allied partners, which increases the 
likelihood of other nations extending support for future agreements. The overall benefit 
of clearly outlining the movement of U.S. forces abroad, in terms of financial support for 
forces and the international political goodwill and support, far outweighs the possible 
negative backlash experienced in making adjustments to strategic vision. Simply stated, it 
is better to clearly communicate intentions and endure criticism than to risk 
implementation failure due to lack of support. 
The next step in pursuit of the PPAA is gaining support in the executive branch of 
the United States government. If the DOD, DOS, and President can agree upon the PPAA 
then it will fall to legislative approval in the form of funding. The introduction of BMD 
assets into Japan and the ROK will require diplomatic action by the U.S. and host 
nations. The Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State will be needed to discuss the 
addition of U.S. assets into Japan and the ROK prior to a public announcement by the 
respective heads of state. The possibility of a trilateral defense agreement would require 
significant diplomatic involvement and maneuvering. The specifics of diplomacy are too 
dynamic to outline until the PPAA is announced and discussed with partner nations. 
In summary, the DPRK poses a threat to the United States and regional allies in 
the Asia Pacific. The United States should pursue the PPAA outlined in this thesis. The 
PPAA will flow similar to the EPAA. By increasing the number of BMD sensors, 
interceptors, and communications platforms in the Asia Pacific, in coordination with 
Japan and the ROK, the United States will be prepared to engage a BMD threat from 
North Korea. The best possible outcome also involves a trilateral defense agreement 
between the United States, the ROK, and Japan. The most feasible outcome is for the 
United States to deploy BMD assets in four phases under existing bilateral defense 
agreements. If the United States enacts the PPAA in conjunction with international 
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support, then the United States will be defending regional allies, strengthening relations 
in the Asia Pacific, deterring North Korean aggression, and defending the U.S. homeland. 
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